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THE MARKET FOR BAD LEGAL ADVICE:
Academic Professional Responsibility Consulting as an Example
William H. Simon∗
Clients demand bad legal advice when legal advice can favorably
influence third-party conduct or attitudes even when it is wrong.
Lawyers supply bad legal advice most readily when they are
substantially immunized from accountability to the people it is intended
to influence. Both demand and supply conditions for a flourishing
market are in place in several quarters of the legal system. The resulting
practices, however, are in tension with basic professional and academic
values. I demonstrate these tensions through critiques of the work of
academic professional responsibility consultants in such matters as
Enron, Lincoln Savings & Loan, and a heretofore undiscussed aggregate
litigation settlement. I also suggest reforms to reduce the incentives and
pressures for bad advice that now prevail.
I. Introduction
On several notorious occasions in recent years, lawyers gave
clients bad legal advice because the clients wanted it.
Lawyers from Andrews and Kurth and from Vinson and Elkins
gave opinions to Enron that various asset transfers represented “true
sales” or involved a “true issuance” of securities even though the
opinions were either plainly wrong or plainly irrelevant to the
circumstances they addressed.1
Lawyers at Jenkins & Gilchrist gave hundreds of opinions to
taxpayers to the effect that bizarrely complex and economically
substanceless transactions with names like “COBRA” [Currency Options
Bring Reward Alternatives] were acceptable ways to reduce taxes. Some

∗

Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia University.
See “Appendix C (Role of Enron’s Attorneys) to Final Report of Neal Batson,
Court-Appointed Examiner,” In re Enron Corp. (Bankruptcy Ct., S.D.N.Y.), at 26-90
(hereafter "Batson report").
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of them were virtually copies of transactions that the IRS had
specifically condemned.2
John Yoo, Jay Bybee, and other lawyers at the Department of
Justice gave opinions to federal officials concluding that various
statutory and international law constraints on the President in the “war
on terror” were unconstitutional or otherwise not binding. The opinions
exaggerated the authority for the conclusions and omitted inconsistent
arguments and precedent.3
In all these cases, the clients seemed happy to get the bad advice,
at least in the short term and sometimes in the long term. They were
happy because the advice made it easier for them to do things they
wanted to do – overstate income on financial statements, underpay taxes,
or torture people.
The bad advice made life easier for the clients because,
regardless of its merit, it conferred on them a significant measure of
immunity from liability or public criticism. In the corporate area, a legal
opinion may raise the bar for a shareholder action by satisfying a
condition for the “due diligence” defense or the “business judgment”
rule. In the tax area, a lawyer’s opinion may help establish the “good
faith” and “reasonable cause” that enables a taxpayer to avoid penalties
for underpayment. And opinions often make the “advice of counsel”
excuse available either as a response to a criminal charge or a persuasive
argument in the court of public opinion.
This capacity to influence public authority or public opinion does
not fit easily within the most prevalent understanding of the lawyer’s
role. Influence of this kind requires the lawyer to purport to speak
impartially, rather than as a partisan. Moreover, when the lawyer advises
a client, she is normally subject to strong legal mechanisms of
accountability to the client. Yet, the lawyer is not comparably
accountable to the ultimate public addressees of the advice in our
examples.
The public dimension of this advice-giving/immunity conferring
role might seem more appropriate for academic lawyers. Academic
lawyers can represent clients in a conventional partisan fashion, but
when they express views in their academic roles, the norms of the
2

Paul Braverman, “Helter Shelter,” The American Lawyer (December 5, 2003).
Jose E. Alvarez, “Torturing the Law,” 37 Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law 175 (2006).
3
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academy require that they speak sincerely and disinterestedly. From an
academic point of view, however, there is a distinctive problem with
advice designed to confer immunity. The norms of the academy regard
openness and transparency as an essential guarantee of the reliability of a
scholar’s views. Yet, exonerating opinions are most often subject to
conditional secrecy. Typically, the client wants to keep the advice
confidential unless she needs to reveal it in order to respond to some
challenge to her conduct, and even then, she may want to limit disclosure
to a minimum. Thus, the academic lawyer is also in an anomalous
position. She invokes the authority of her role and institution as
emblems of both acuity and impartiality; yet she forswears the norms of
openness that the academic world regards as essential to such claims.
This essay is about legal advice in which lawyers purport to
speak disinterestedly in order to influence public conduct or attitudes for
the benefit of private clients, and which is given under conditions of nonaccountability and secrecy. I call such efforts “quasi-third-party advice.”
The essay focuses on the issues of professional and academic integrity
raised by quasi-third-party opinions on legal ethics issues by academic
lawyers. Much of it also applies to non-academic lawyers in their
opinion practices. And much of it applies as well to non-lawyer
academics who give opinions with legal consequences, for example, as
expert witnesses in litigation.
I argue that quasi-third-party opinion practice in its currently
prevalent form is inconsistent with core professional and academic
values. The key problem does not lie in the assumption of public
responsibility by lawyers or in the fact that academics consult for money
for private clients. Rather, from both professional and academic
perspectives, the key problem lies in the absence of transparency.
Part II elaborates the issues posed by quasi-third-party practice,
and suggests some appropriate responses in terms of both professional
and academic ethics, using as examples opinions given by Charles
Wolfram of Cornell in connection with Vinson & Elkins’s work for
Enron and by Geoffrey Hazard of the University of Pennsylvania in
connection with the Kaye Scholer firm’s work for Lincoln Savings &
Loan.
Part III further illustrates the problem with a case study. In this
case, three prominent academics – Geoffrey Hazard, Roy Simon of
Hofstra, and Bruce Green of Fordham – gave bad legal advice with
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potentially large public consequences. The case involved a non-class
aggregate litigation campaign of a kind that involves many claimants and
raises important issues of procedure and ethics, but that typically eludes
public view through confidentiality agreements.4
The academic
professional responsibility experts played important roles as enablers of
pernicious (and heretofore largely undiscussed) practices. Thus, the case
shows the convergence of an underground of litigation practice with an
underground of academic practice – practitioners and academics allying
under terms designed to immunize each other from accountability.
When I say that the three academics gave “bad legal advice,” I
am being provocative. My opinions are different from theirs. However,
the value of the case study does not depend on whether I am right about
the merits. The important contribution is to show that the form such
advice takes and the conditions under which it is given reflect pressures
and incentives that undermine confidence in its reliability.
II. The Problem of Quasi-Third-Party Academic Advice
A. Defining the Problem
We are interested in advice by academic lawyers that has two
characteristics: first, it has an externality in the form of an influence on
third party conduct or attitude for which the advisor is not strongly
accountable, and second, it is subject to significant secrecy.
The relevant measure of strong accountability is the common law
duty of care that a lawyer owes a client when giving first-party advice.
The lawyer is sometimes charged with a comparable duty to addressees
of certain traditional third-party opinions. For example, major financing
agreements often require that the borrower’s lawyer provide an opinion
addressed to the lender attesting to various matters, such as that the
borrower is duly authorized to enter the agreement. Doctrine generally
recognizes a duty of care comparable (at least in principle) to that owed a
client.5
4

See generally, David Luban, “Settlements and the Erosion of the Public
Realm,” 83 Georgetown Law Journal 2619 (1995); Howard Erichson, “Beyond the
Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective
Representation,” 2003 University of Chicago Legal Forum 519.
5
E.g, Graycas v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1980); see generally Jonathan
M. Barnett, “Certification Drag: The Opinion Puzzle and Other Transactional
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By contrast, quasi-third party advice may not be directly
addressed to third parties. Often, although there is a tacit understanding
that the client will show the opinion to third parties if he needs to, the
client is the only explicit addressee. In other cases, the opinions are
addressed directly to third-parties, but the addressees are too diffuse or
remote to satisfy the privity requirements for strong duties.
Take the “advice of counsel” excuse. A client who receives
advice that a course of conduct is lawful can sometimes escape criminal
sanctions, even when the advice proves wrong.6 At the extreme, such
advice can amount to "get-out-of-jail-free cards," as Jack Goldsmith
characterizes certain Office of Legal Counsel opinions. Where bad
advice causes the client to incur liability, the advisor will often be liable
to the client. But where the bad advice helps the client escape liability,
the advisor has no comparable accountability to the officials or members
of the public who bear the costs of the bad advice.
Sometimes the advisor will have some accountability to the third
parties, but it will be weaker than a full-fledged duty of care. For
example, lawyers owe a duty to public shareholders not to assist
managerial fraud under the securities laws, but under the Central Bank of
Denver case7, that liability cannot be enforced through private damage
actions. Or to take another context central to our inquiry, the expert
litigation witness owes a duty of candor to the court, but the only
enforceable form of that duty is the perjury statute, and perjury is hard to
prove in the case of opinions. There is no liability for negligence or
recklessness.8
Curiosities,” J. Corp. L. (forthcoming 2007). Barnett points out that courts seem
more reluctant to enforce the duty in the third-party than in the first-party context.
6
The Terror Presidency 97 (2007). See John T. Perry, “Culpability, Mistake,
and Official Interpretation of Law,” 25 Am J. Crim L. 1 (1997) The exculpatory effect
of advice from private counsel is more limited, but a substantial effect is recognized
with respect to both civil and criminal claims requiring proof of willfulness or bad faith.
See, e.g., id. at 69-75; U.S. v. Baldwin, 307 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1962); Mahurker v. C.R.
Bard, 79 F.3d 1572, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
7
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
8
Even liability for perjury cannot be enforced privately. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460
U,S. 325 (1983) (affirming the traditional common law immunity of witnesses from
damage claims). For a survey and critique of the doctrine as applied to experts see John
L. Harrison, "Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current Controls,
and Proposed Responses," 18 Yale Journal on Regulation 253 (2001).
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The second defining condition of our subject is secrecy. It might
seem that exonerating opinions would by their nature be publicly
accessible. But this is not the case. Clients often want the advice to
remain secret unless and until it is needed and to strictly control its
distribution afterwards.
Academic lawyers tend to be asked for quasi-third-party opinions
in two general contexts. In the ex ante context, the client asks for the
opinion before she embarks on the desired conduct. Most often, the
client would prefer to hold the opinion in reserve for use in the event of
public inquiry. In this context, the lawyer’s role will be that of a legal
advisor, and traditional attorney-client confidentiality will apply by
default.
In the ex post situation, public inquiry is ongoing, and the client
asks for exoneration with respect to past conduct (or sometimes, for
inculpation with respect to an opposing party’s past conduct). Here the
academic lawyer is likely to be retained as an expert witness.9 The
default rule is less clear in this context,10 but the prevalent practice is for
the client to ask the expert to sign a non-disclosure agreement precluding
the expert from any kind of discussion of the case or facts learned from
the client without the client’s authorization. Occasionally, the client in
this context will go public with the expert’s opinion, but usually only
under tightly controlled circumstances. The client would be more likely
to distribute a written statement by the expert vetted by the client or
perhaps prepared by the client’s lawyers and approved by the expert than

9

Courts commonly admit academic opinions on whether challenged lawyer
conduct is consistent with professional responsibility norms despite the objection that
admission violates the traditional rule against testimony on matters of law. See Carl M.
Selinger, “The Problematical Role of the Legal Ethics Expert Witness,” 13 Georgetown
Journal of Legal Ethics 405, 408-18 (1999-2000).
10
Some cases hold that rules like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)
impliedly prohibit ex parte contact with opposing experts. See 6 Moore's Federal
Practice sec. 26.801[4]. Others have disqualified experts from testifying adversely to
former clients in matters related to the former engagement. E.g., Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co. v. Harnischferger, 734 F. Supp. 334, 336-37 (N.D. Ill. 1990). These cases
might be taken to imply that the testifying expert has a duty of confidentiality even in
the absence of agreement, but it is debatable whether such a duty is entailed by or even
compatible with the expert's role. See generally Samuel Gross, "Expert Evidence,"
1991 Wisconsin Law Review 1113, 1148-52.
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to allow the expert to speak spontaneously or to respond to questions or
arguments.
In litigation, the expert who is retained to testify begins by
preparing a written report, which is given to the opposing party; is then
deposed; and finally, if the case gets that far, testifies at trial. You would
think that at some point the opinion would become publicly accessible,
but this is often not the case. Since discovery materials are rarely filed
before trial and most cases do not reach trial, the expert’s report and
deposition often do not become part of the case record. Even when there
is a trial and the expert testifies, the record is often accessible only at
considerable expense and inconvenience. And many settlements provide
for the record to be sealed. Thus, as a practical matter, the expert's
opinions are often inaccessible.
Secrecy removes another mechanism of lawyer accountability.
An academic who repeatedly gave bad advice in public would suffer
serious loss of prestige in the academic world, especially if she was
doing it in the pay of interested parties. Consider the academic
reputations of scientists who have publicly disputed global warming or
tobacco toxicity under the patronage of the energy or cigarette industries.
But as Samuel Gross puts it, "what the expert witness says in court [and
a fortiori, in ex ante opinions] is generally invisible and inaudible in her
own professional field."11
Similarly, the exoneration or inculpation potential of bad advice
from a lawyer with a reputation for giving bad advice consistently would
be small. But the public and public officials know nothing about most
such opinions, and rarely know enough about the ones they know
anything about to form a judgment about their plausibility.
B. Professional Responsibility
Professional responsibility norms recognize strong duties of care
and loyalty to clients and modest duties of respect for law to strangers
and the public. The strong duties require the lawyer to take initiative to
acquire information and make disclosures to protect the client’s interests.
The modest duties characteristically do not do not require initiative or
affirmative disclosure; they are usually satisfied when the lawyer refrains
from misrepresentation and complies with clear legal commands.

11

Gross, cited in note , at 1178.
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There has been some recognition that this doctrinal structure is
inadequate in the situation where the lawyer gives advice the purpose of
which is to produce the third party effects with which we are concerned.
An early step in this direction was the application of the “due diligence”
idea to lawyers in the securities context. Lawyers tend to think of “due
diligence” as a streamlined duty of care to securities investors. The duty
is not as strong as a full fledged fiduciary duty to a client, but it is
stronger than conventional duties to strangers.12
1. Lessons from Tax Practice
The most ambitious response has occurred in recent years in the
tax area. The IRS and some groups within the tax bar have become
concerned about the effects on legal advice of the two phenomena I have
singled out – third party effects and secrecy. The principal third party
effect arises from “penalty protection”. The taxpayer can often avoid a
penalty for underpayment if she can show “reasonable cause” and “good
faith,”13 and an opinion is a key part of the usual showing. Secrecy
arises in part from the fact that there is often a high probability that the
IRS will never identify the questionable maneuver. The issue may not
be apparent except on searching examination of the return, and the IRS
fails to examine most returns more than superficially. If the issue is
never identified, the IRS never learns about it. Moreover, when
promoters have marketed aggressive tax shelters in recent years, they
have typically insisted on strict confidentiality commitments from their
clients.
The tax sections of the American Bar Association and the New
York State Bar Association have written insightfully about the threats to
professional responsibility posed by this situation. A key report from the
New York section identifies the problem as an inversion of the
traditional professional understanding of the nature and effect of legal
advice. The bar assumes that legal advice is a social good because it
tends to induce compliance with law.14 Where, however, legal advice
12

Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation sec. 7.4 (2d ed, 2002).
Strictly speaking, ‘due diligence” is a defense to a fraud claim. However, the securities
laws developed a particularly demanding version of fraud liability which sometimes
treats failure to disclose as misrepresentation and failure to learn as tantamount to
knowledge. The net effect is that of an enhanced duty.
13
IRC 6662A (penalty abatement for “reportable transactions”).
14
E.g., ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6; Comment, par.s 3, 9.
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affords exoneration independently of its merit, there is demand for bad
advice, which induces socially undesirable behavior. The report worries
about the reciprocal corrosion of client motivation and professional
morale when the focus of the “tax dialogue” between lawyer and client
shifts from the requirements of law to “whether an opinion will be
rendered or not.” The section urges reforms designed to restore clients’
incentive to seek “the most accurate legal advice [rather than] the most
aggressive.”15
Congress and the IRS have responded to the problem by
producing a new set of norms for tax practice enforced by financial
penalties and IRS disciplinary sanctions. The regime focuses especially
on opinions with third-party effects – what the IRS calls “reliance
opinions” intended to be used for penalty protection and “marketing
opinions” given to promoters for use in selling shelter advice to
corporate and high-income individual customers.
Some of the provisions aim to limit the conditions of third-party
effects or secrecy that produce the demand for bad legal advice; some
focus on the supply side by imposing requirements on the production of
quasi-third party opinions. On the demand side we find rules
conditioning penalty protection on disclosure. Since the American Job
Creation Act of 2004, penalty protection in connection with certain
shelter-like “reportable transactions” requires “disclosure” of the
transaction on the return.16 In addition, opinions by lawyers who
participated in developing the transaction or were compensated by
promoters cannot be used for this purpose.17 Moreover, lawyers advising
15

“Report on Corporate Tax Shelters of the New York State Bar Association Tax
Section,” 1999 TNT Lexstat 82-29 (April 29, 1992), at 20. Tanina Rostain was the first
to draw attention to the general importance of the work of the New York and ABA tax
sections. “Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry,”
23 Yale Journal on Regulation 77 (2006). The two tax sections do not speak for the
whole tax bar; other segments take a more antinomian perspective. For an overview,
see Dennis Ventry, “From Cooperation to Competition: Imagining a New Tax
Compliance Norm,” (Unpub. 2007). I am grateful to Dennis Ventry for helpful
discussion of the regulation of tax practice.
16
IRC 6662, 6664(d)(2)(A). A weaker but still important safeguard is the
evidence doctrine that, once a client asserts “advice of counsel” as an excuse, she
waives privilege with respect to all advice on the relevant subject matter. Thus, she
cannot produce a favorable opinion while asserting privilege with respect to
unfavorable ones. In re Echostar, 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
17
IRC 6664(3)(B).
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with regard to such transactions must produce a list of clients to the IRS
on demand, thus making it likely that all will be audited if any are
discovered.18 Most radically, lawyers who advise with regard to some
shelter-like transactions have to report the advice to the IRS on an
information return.19
The second category of principles governs the content of tax
opinions likely to have third-party effects. These principles have been
promulgated by the Treasury Department in regulations known as
“Circular 230.”20 Although expressed in a distinctive rhetoric and
format, they can be usefully summarized in terms of five broad norms –
candor, clarity; due diligence; analytical support, and reasonable
framing. If complemented by one further principle – updating – they
could provide a plausible starting point for a general approach to quasithird-party opinions.
Candor. The lawyer has to explain her own role, and in
particular, any interest or stake she has in the success of the matter on
which she opines.21 For example, if she helped design the transaction or
if her compensation is contingent on the taxpayer’s success in realizing
the tax benefits, she must disclose that.
Clarity. The lawyer has to be clear both about the issues on which
she is opining and about the strength of her conclusion. A general
statement to the effect that a transaction is “appropriate” is objectionable
in two respects. First, it may not be clear which issues and potential
objections have been considered and rejected. Circular 230 deals with
this problem by requiring the lawyer to opine on every material tax issue
or to identify any excluded issues and explain why the opinion excludes
them. 22
Second, it may be unclear what kind or level of conviction the
lawyer is asserting. When an advocate asserts a position on behalf of a
client, she typically implies no personal conviction beyond a belief that
18

IRC 6112.
IRC 6707, 6707A.
20
31 CFR 10.35 et seq. These regulations were influenced by an ABA ethics
committee opinion proposing distinctive standards for shelter opinions with third party
effects. ABA Standing Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 346 (Jan. 29, 1982).
21
See 31 CFR 10.35(e)(1)-(2).
22
31 CFR 10.35(c)(3)-(4).
19
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the position is not frivolous.23 When the lawyer opines as an expert to
third parties, she is usually taken to connote a higher threshold of
conviction.
But what is this threshold? The expert’s opinion is generally
understood to express what he believes to be the “best” understanding of
the relevant law. But of course, the expert can hold a view about the best
understanding at various levels of confidence. Moreover, an expert
conclusion typically combines (a) the expert’s view of how the issue
would be resolved by those with ultimate authority over the matter and
(b) his view of how the issue should be resolved (for example, how the
expert would resolve it himself if he were in authority). Most lawyers’
understanding of disinterested legal judgment combines both these
elements, but there is disagreement about their relative weights. How
important such disagreements are depends on how idiosyncratic the
opiner’s own substantive views are. If the opiner’s views are
mainstream, then her understandings of how the issue would be resolved
and how it should be resolved will tend to converge. Even where the
opiner’s views are idiosyncratic, the stakes with respect to these matters
may not be that great as long as the opiner makes clear what approach
she is taking and explains the ways in which her substantive convictions
are idiosyncratic.
Consider the “torture memos.” If a client had asked for a memo
setting out the strongest legal arguments that could be made in favor of
the administration’s interrogation practices for suspected enemy
combatants, it would be reasonable for a lawyer to respond with analyses
such as those in the memos. The problem, of course, is the memos were
not styled as advocacy, but as expertise. They purported to set out, ex
officio, the views of the Office of Legal Counsel. In this context, the
memos might still have been acceptable if the authors had made clear
that they were setting forth the positions they would take if they had
ultimate authority to apply the law, while making clear how and why
their views were idiosyncratic. But they failed to do this.
Circular 230 has a plausible clarity-forcing measure. A tax
lawyer has a duty in giving an opinion with third-party effects to give a
“more likely than not” conclusion or explain why she cannot give such a
conclusion. “More likely than not” means a belief that the probability
23

See ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1.
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exceeds fifty percent that a well-informed official or tribunal with
ultimate authority over the matter would adopt the position in question.24
At the same time, the rule makes clear that the expert should give a
normative rather than a predictive judgment. The opiner is specifically
precluded from considering the likelihood that the transaction will
actually be officially reviewed – the likelihood of audit.25 “More likely
than not” is a heuristic designed to specify a level of confidence and a
jurisprudential perspective that gives greatest weight to established
authority and mainstream modes of argument over idiosyncratic
substantive interpretation.
Due Diligence. Circular 230 takes over the principle associated
with securities regulation that lawyers cannot accept clients’
characterizations or conclusions without inquiring into underlying facts
and, when they have reason to doubt the client’s report of material facts,
must demand substantiation.26 The core example in tax is the client’s
assertion that some tax avoidance transaction has a non-tax “business
purpose.” Before the lawyer can assume such a conclusion, she must be
given basic facts that are at least facially plausible to support it.
Analytical support. Under Circular 230, “[t]he opinion must
relate the applicable law … to the relevant facts.”27 Quasi-third party
opinions should be reasoned opinions. The lawyer may not set forth
critical non-obvious legal propositions as conclusions supported only by
her reputation and credentials.
Reasonable framing. The lawyer cannot unreasonably exclude
issues that are material to the client’s purpose and within her expertise.
In particular, she cannot pick out those issues on which she can support a
favorable view while ignoring the rest.28 This principle would condemn
the fairly common practice in financial transactions of stating principles
broadly and then proceeding to qualify them virtually out of existence.29
24

31 CFR 10.35(c)(3)(ii).
31 CFR 10.34(d)(1).
26
31 CFR 10.22, 10.35(c)(1).
27
31 CFR 10.35(c)(2).
28
31 CFR 10.35(c)(3)(ii).
29
Barnett, cited in
, at
. 26-27. Vinson & Elkins’s “true issuance”
opinions for Enron were qualified by the assumption that a court would not
recharacterize the transactions in question as loans (rather than sales). Since the whole
point of the opinions was to justify accounting treatment that depended entirely on the
25
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At least, it would require clear identification of the omitted issues and an
explanation of why they cannot be addressed.
Updating and correction. Finally, I would add a sixth standard
that does not appear in Circular 230 but should be part of any set of
principles of quasi-third party opinions – a duty to update in the light of
new information where there is continuing reliance on the opinion.
In general, the bar has tended toward the position that the default
rule in conventional third-party opinions should be that there is no duty
to update.30 Where the third party opinion is given on behalf of a client,
the bar has interpreted confidentiality duties to the client to preclude
correction without the client’s consent.
This situation changed somewhat following the OPM scandal of
the 1970s. In OPM, lawyers gave many opinions to lenders on behalf of
a leasing company client asserting that leases serving as collateral for
loans were valid and enforceable. When they discovered that the client
had forged many of the leases, they remained silent, relying partly on the
advice of an ethics expert that they were precluded from warning the
lenders.31
The bar became concerned that denial of even the option to
correct would put the lawyer at risk of liability under common law fraud
principles. The common law sometimes requires correction where a
person discovers that a statement he previously made in good faith is
false and there is “continuing reliance” on it by the addressee.32 The bar
thus re-interpreted its rules to allow a lawyer without client consent to
engage in “noisy withdrawal” from the client by “disavowing” the
opinion to the third party.33 The newest version of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly permits any disclosures that

correctness of this assumption, the opinions were disclaiming responsibility for the only
issue that was material to its purpose. Batson report, cited in note , at 23, 34-35.
30
ABA Section of Business Law, “Third Party Legal Opinion Report”
(Silverado Report), sec. 9, 47 Bus. Law. 167 (1991).
31
For the story of OPM, see Stuart Taylor, Jr., “Ethics and the Law: A Case
History” New York Times, Jan. 9, 1983, sec. 6 (Magazine). The relevant rules then (as
now) plainly permitted warnings of ongoing fraud.
32
E.g., Restatement (2d) of Torts sec. 551(d).
33
ABA Standing Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Opinion 92-366.
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would mitigate or rectify the effects of client fraud in which the lawyer
was involved.34
The case for a duty (not just the permission the ABA rules give)
to update in the quasi-third party situation is strong. The purpose of such
opinions is to induce third-party reliance; so the opiner should be
responsible as long as such reliance continues. The ultimate addressees
of quasi-third party opinions, unlike those of conventional third-party
opinions, are not in a position to bargain for such a duty; so if they are to
have this protection, it must be mandated. Moreover, once the client
goes public and presents the lawyer’s opinion as expertise (rather than
advocacy), it has waived any plausible claim to confidentiality.35
2. An Illustration: Charles Wolfram on Vinson & Elkins (Enron)
As an illustration of how these principles might be applied
outside the tax area, consider the opinion reprinted in Appendix I that
Charles Wolfram of Cornell gave with regard to Vinson & Elkins’s
representation of Enron. The opinion addressed V & E’s role in Enron’s
response to the letter written by the in-house accountant Sherron Watkins
to CEO Ken Lay in August, 2001. Watkins warned that Enron might
“implode in a wave of accounting scandals” and drew particular attention
to a set of transactions known as “the Raptors.” These were ostensibly
“hedge” transactions intended to obviate recognition of declines in value
of certain merchant investments on Enron’s income statements. In fact,
they were not hedges in any functional sense; they did not affect Enron’s
exposure to risk or reward with respect to the investments. (In the
Orwellian rhetoric of notes made at a meeting of the board finance
34

ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(3).
Circular 230-type standards are designed primarily for ex ante opinions. They
may require some softening in the litigation context. A less demanding standard of
"due diligence" might seem appropriate where the expert's factual assumptions will be
subject to adversarial challenge and demands for evidentiary support. It might also
seem appropriate to leave the parties more discretion to choose and shape issues when
opposing lawyers and experts stand ready to fill any lacunae. Still, the basic standards
of clarity, candor, and reasoned explanation apply. Moreover, one should not overestimate the power of adversary process to neutralize the defects of opinion evidence.
Most cases are settled, and I have heard more than one academic expert justify large
retainers on the ground that the mere announcement that he has agreed to testify
substantially increases the settlement value of the client's claim. Such assertions imply
an influence that could readily be abused despite adversarial checks. For a discussion
of the problems of expert testimony and a range of possible responses, see Gross, cited
in note ; Harrison, cited in note .
35
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committee, “Does not transfer economic risk but transfers P&L [income
statement] volatility.”36) Watkins made two points about the Raptors:
They amounted to accounting fraud, and they involved large
unjustifiable payments to Enron’s chief financial officer Andrew Fastow.
Watkins urged an investigation and specifically warned that
Enron’s regular outside counsel, Vinson & Elkins, should not be used:
“Can’t use V & E due to conflict; they provided true sale opinions on
some of the deals.” Nonetheless, Enron’s general counsel and V & E
decided that the latter would conduct the investigation.
The
investigation was to be a “preliminary investigation” to see if a broader
one would be warranted. Moreover, the investigation was not to involve
“second guessing” of judgments made by Arthur Andersen, Enron’s
auditors, or by Enron’s board, but merely an effort to determine whether
Watkins had any material information that these decisionmakers were
unaware of when they made their decisions. They concluded that there
was no new information and reported back in a letter dated October 15,
2001, that Watkins’s letter gave no cause for concern or more extensive
investigation.37
By this time, however, Enron was imploding in the manner
Watkins predicted. As the collapse became visible, the board appointed
a committee of independent directors, which in turn hired new counsel,
who in turn retained new accountants as consultants. The result was the
“Powers report” released in February, 2002, analyzing and documenting
a large number of improper accounting maneuvers and self-dealing
transactions, including the Raptors, of the sort Watkins had pointed to.
The Powers report was critical of V & E on many fronts. With respect to
the response to the Watkins letter, it wrote, “The result of the V & E
review was largely determined by the scope and nature of the
investigation and the process employed.” In particular, it faulted V & E
for failing to seek review of relevant accounting judgments by unbiased
accountants, for speaking only to a limited number of senior Enron

36

William C. Powers, Jr., et al., “Report of Investigation by the Special
Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp.” Feb. 1, 2002, at 157
(hereafter “the Powers Report”). The Watkins letter is reprinted in Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, Destruction
of Enron-Related Documents 39-44 (January 24, 2002).
37
V & E’s letter is reprinted in id, at 46-54.
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people “most of whom had personal stakes in the matters under review,”
and for conducting the review with “less skepticism than was needed.”38
V & E retained Williams & Connolly to represent it in
connection with Enron-related liability, and Wolfram delivered to the
firm a letter dated just six weeks after the Powers report opining on V &
E’s conduct in the Watkins investigation. The letter has been circulated
widely but selectively. It has been referred to in the press and cited in
law review articles, and it has been shown to parties in Enron litigation
as an indication of testimony that Wolfram might give on V & E’s
behalf.39 On the other hand, it has never been generally released, and
when I asked for a copy in 2003, I was refused.
Wolfram begins by saying he is responding to a request for his
opinion on “whether Vinson & Elkins acted appropriately in undertaking
for Enron a preliminary investigation” in response to the Watkins letter.
He then states his conclusion that the firm acted “both properly and
ethically”. The opinion, he tells us, is based on the facts set out in V &
E’s letter to Enron on its investigation and the Powers report.
About half of the four-page letter recites facts from V & E’s
letter. Along the way, Wolfram opines that it is “customary and
appropriate” for a company to conduct a “preliminary investigation”
before undertaking a “full scale” one; that V & E had no preclusive
conflict of interest by virtue of having worked on the transactions
Watkins questioned because Watkins’s concerns focused on “business
and accounting issues” and thus V & E “would not be sitting in judgment
of its own legal services;” that V & E’s prior receipt of large fees from
Enron did not create a conflicts problem; and that V & E “could properly
accept the judgment of the accountants, board members, employees, and
officers in reaching its conclusions.”
Measured by the standards discussed above, the letter is
unsatisfactory in at least four respects.
Clarity. The letter is coyly ambiguous about how broadly its
claim that V & E acted “appropriately” should be understood. Wolfram
does clearly (and as we will see, wrongly) reject Watkins’s claim that V
& E had a conflict under the professional responsibility rules that
38

Powers report, cited in note , at 174, 176-77.
Mike France, “Can Law Profs Consult – and Keep Their Distance?,” Business
Week (Feb. 2, 2004); Roger Cramton, “Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on
the Legal and Ethical Issues,” 58 The Business Lawyer 143, 166 n. 109 (2002).
39
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affected its ability to undertake any investigation into Watkins’s
concerns. But beyond that his intentions are mystifying. The Powers’
report’s most important criticism was that V & E should have sought
new accounting advice and interviewed more widely, especially people
not dependent on Andrew Fastow. Are we to understand by Wolfram’s
general endorsement of V & E’s conduct as “appropriate” and his
statement that V & E “could properly accept the word of the officers of
its client and rely on the judgment of the accountants, Board members,
employees, and officers” that he rejects this complaint? Surely he cannot
be saying that that a lawyer investigating allegations of corporate
wrongdoing can accept conclusory reassurances from the alleged
wrongdoers. If this is not the principle, then what is?
The Powers
report tells us, for example, that V & E failed to interview former
employees (from whom one might expect more candor than current
ones), including two recommended by Watkins, that it never sought to
find out how much Fastow profited from the self-dealing transactions,
and that it failed to discover serious lapses in the Board oversight process
for related-party dealings.40 Is Wolfram opining that such failures are
consistent with a competent investigation? If so, is he doing so just as a
matter of professional responsibility, or also as a matter of corporate law
or the customary duty of care for a business lawyer? The letter gives no
indication.
Reasonable framing. Wolfram’s most salient contention –
repeated in three variations – is that, “Before initiating … an independent
investigation, it is customary and appropriate for a corporation to
conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine whether such an independent
investigation is warranted.” Yet, this conclusion merely raises the
further question of whether information V & E acquired or should have
acquired in the “preliminary” investigation should have led it to
recommend a full-scale one. Wolfram offers no consideration of this
question.
The focus on the permissibility of a “preliminary”
investigation simply sidesteps the main criticism of the Powers report,
which is that there should have been more investigation than there was.
Supporting Analysis. The one opinion clearly expressed in the
letter is that V & E did not violate professional responsibility rules on
40

At 174, 158-65. On Watkins’s recommendation, see Batson report, cited in
note , at 166,
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conflicts of interest by undertaking the investigation. Yet, this opinion is
explained only by an assertion that Watkins's letter raised only “issues of
business and accounting judgment” and did not concern “the quality of
the legal work previously performed for Enron by Vinson & Elkins.”
Thus, V & E “would not be sitting in judgment of its own legal
services.” This premise is asserted as a conclusion without any analysis
or any acknowledgement of alternative views. Yet, it is highly
controversial. In my view, it is wrong.
Wolfram adopts V & E’s and Enron management’s
understanding of their roles with respect to financial reporting. In this
view, what goes on a financial statement is governed by accounting rules
and the judgments of accountants. Managers and lawyers discharge their
responsibility when they transmit material information to the
accountants. At least until they have reason to believe the accountants
are corrupt or unqualified, they need not reconsider judgments the
accountants make.
The problem with this view is that the securities laws preclude
any clean separation of accounting and legal judgments. The laws
incorporate Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and
some GAAP standards, including the one most pertinent to structured
finance, in turn incorporate legal rules.41 More fundamentally, the laws
require that financial statements both comply with GAAP and be “not
misleading.” Every assertion must comply with the “not misleading”
standard, and thus every assertion potentially involves a legal judgment.
Judge Henry Friendly spelled this out in a 1969 opinion the memory of
which seems to have been collectively repressed by a broad segment of
the securities bar during the 1990s boom.42
41

Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 125: Accounting for Transfers and Services of Financial Assets, and
Extinguishments of Liabilities (June 1996), par. 23 (explaining that proper treatment
depends on specified "factors pertinent under applicable law."). See generally
Lawrence Cunningham, “Sharing Accounting’s Burden: Business Lawyers in Enron’s
Dark Shadows,” 57 Business Lawyer 1421, 1436-38 (2002) (noting the pervasiveness
of "mixed questions of law and accounting" in business practice and specifically in
structured finance).
42
United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805-07 (2d Cir. 1969) (compliance with
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles does not exonerate an otherwise misleading
statement); see also Thomas L. Hazen, The Law of Regulation 610-11 (4th ed. 2002)
(same).
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Watkins was making the same point as Friendly. She conceded
that the accounting might be technically correct.43 The problem, she
said, was that the overall impression obscured information that would
“affect … the investment decisions” of “the man in the street.” She
called this effect a violation of the “overriding principle of accounting,”
but the overriding principle of securities law is substantially the same.44
V & E had been pervasively involved in structuring and
documenting the transactions.45 The Powers report made clear that it did
so knowing that they had no purpose other than to generate accounting
effects that, among other things, would obscure huge declines in the
value of Enron’s assets. Whether this fact alone made the transactions
fraudulent is still debatable, but there has never been a time when it was
reasonable to think that it did not raise a legal issue.46
Update. After Wolfram wrote his letter, his Cornell colleague
Roger Cramton pointed out in a law review article that whether V & E
had a disqualifying conflict with respect to the Watkins inquiry turned,
not on the abstract characterization of the issues as accounting or legal,
but whether V & E had reason to fear being sued if the Raptors were
determined to be improper.47 V & E’s letter specifically mentioned the
possibility of a “class action,” and given the firm’s pervasive
involvement, it should have expected to be named in any such suit. In
fact, a class action was brought; V & E was named; and the court upheld
the complaint against V & E’s motion to dismiss, citing Cramton’s
analysis of the Watkins inquiry issues with approval.48
43

Batson Report, cited in note , at 165.
See, e.g., TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)
(information is material for proxy disclosure purposes when "there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider information important in deciding how to
vote").
45
Batson Report, cited in note , 161-62. Watkins, however, was mistaken in
saying that the firm had given “true sale” opinions with respect to the “Raptors.” Id. at
162.
46
Compare Steven Schwarcz, “The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in
Structured Finance,” 84 Texas Law Review 1, 27-28, 31-32 (2005) with William H.
Simon, “Earnings Management as a Professional Responsibility Problem,” 84 Texas
Law Review 83, 88-91 (2005).
47
Cramton, cited in note , at 165-68.
48
In re Enron, 235 F. Supp.2d 549, 668 n103, 704-05 (S.D.Tex. 2002). The
plaintiffs in the securities class action agreed to dismiss the claims against V & E in late
2006. Kristen Hays, “Law Firm Could Be Cut Free From Suit,” Houston Chronicle
44
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Does Wolfram still hold the views in the letter? How does he
respond to his colleague and the court? Wolfram has not told us. Yet, V
& E’s counsel continues to distribute the original letter in support of its
contention that the firm was blameless.
C. Academic Responsibility
When academic professionals give quasi-third-party opinions,
they raise issues of academic as well as professional responsibility.
University policies typically require both candor and openness
with respect to academic work. Moreover, both formal and informal
norms treat as especially sensitive situations in which outside funders
with a private stake in a subject exert control over disclosure.49
However, the issues raised by quasi-third-party opinions do not
fall squarely within typical current research policy norms. Norms with
respect to candor typically apply to University faculty in any conduct in
which their University affiliation is salient. For example, Stanford’s
policy on research “misconduct” applies “where a Stanford appointment
or official policy is claimed, cited or implied in connection with the
research.” But the most common concerns with quasi-third party
opinions involve secrecy, and University secrecy norms typically apply
to conduct within the University, not to outside work.
Stanford’s
presumptive prohibition against secrecy applies to research “conducted
at Stanford.”50
Nevertheless, the concerns of anti-secrecy norms are pertinent to
quasi-third-party opinion practice, whether or not we deem this practice
(Dec. 8, 2006). It seems unlikely that this decision implies anything about the issues
addressed in Wolfram’s opinion. The largest obstacle to recovery was the doctrine that
there is no private right of action for aiding and abetting, as opposed to primary,
securities fraud. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164 (1994). Although not privately redressable under federal law, aiding and abetting
securities fraud is a (publicly enforceable) wrong under the securities laws, as well as
under professional responsibility rules, ABA Model Rule of Professional Responsibility
1.2(d), and it is a privately enforceable wrong at common law. See Restatement of
Torts sec 876(a).
49
See Derek Bok, Universities in the Marketplace: The Commercialization of
Higher Education (2003); Deborah L. Rhode, In Pursuit of Knowledge: Scholars,
Status, and Academic Culture 47-62 (2006).
50
Stanford University, Research Policy Handbook Doc. 2.5, sec. 1(A)(3); Doc.
2.6, sec. 1, at www.stanford.edu/dept/DoR/rph/ (visited July 16, 2007).
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to occur “at” the University. Third-party opinion practice often gives
individuals with private stakes in the issues significant control over the
expression and disclosure of the academic’s views. Moreover, these
views and the work on which they are based significantly implicate the
academic’s institution. The implication arises because the client, in
disseminating the views, invariably invokes the expert’s University
affiliation and because the third-party effect of the views depends, often
heavily, on the University’s reputation for impartiality and reliability.
For an illustration of the problem, consider Geoffrey Hazard’s
role in the Kaye Scholer affair. In 1992, the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS) brought charges of unprofessional conduct against the Kaye
Scholer law firm in connection with its representation of Lincoln Savings
& Loan, which had undergone one of the more spectacular failures in the
Savings & Loan crisis. The charges were never officially resolved on
the merits; Kaye Scholer settled the case without conceding wrongdoing.
Much of the organized bar rallied around Kaye Scholer, and while
sympathy has been expressed for the charges by academics and
journalists, the dominant impression among practitioners is probably that
they were unfair.
After the charges were announced, Kaye Scholer launched a
public relations campaign in which an early move was the release of a
22-page statement purporting to summarize the opinion of “Professor
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., of the Yale Law School, the nation’s foremost
authority on legal ethics.” The opinion was drafted to convey a general
endorsement of Kaye Scholer’s conduct without acknowledging or
engaging the specifics of any of the OTS charges. In particular, the
opinion adopted the central line of Kaye Scholer’s campaign, which was
to mischaracterize the OTS charges as based on claims of failure to
disclose information about client wrongdoing. Thus, the statement
repeatedly asserted anodyne propositions such as “Kaye Scholer did not
have a duty to disclose weaknesses in Lincoln’s position”. In fact, not
one of the many charges was based on failure to disclose; all the charges
concerning deceit alleged active participation by the firm in the client’s
misconduct. The statement concluded that “in the conduct described
above, Kaye Scholer did not violate existing standards of ethical
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conduct.” Yet, virtually none of the conduct OTS alleged had been
“described above.”51
Hazard’s opinion has been widely cited by Kaye Scholer’s many
defenders. Yet, Hazard has indicated repeatedly but vaguely that the
opinion may not represent his views.52 When I suggested that Hazard
had a duty as an academic to clarify his views and respond to criticisms,
or at least to correct the client’s mischaracterizations of his views, he
denied that he had any such duty, offering as explanation only that there
was “no authority” saying that he did.53
It bewilders me how Yale University or the University of
Pennsylvania (where Hazard subsequently moved) could find such
activity consistent with its dignity and responsibility. Universities do not
vouch for the validity of the views their faculty members express, but
they should oblige them to respect basic guidelines, including one that
insists that an academic must actually believe the views she endorses. In
effect, Hazard rented the University’s imprimatur to Kaye Scholer for his
own profit, allowing the firm to make virtually unconditional use of it.
The use the firm made of the University’s reputation – to give an aura of
soundness and impartiality to its own self-interested conclusion – was
inconsistent with the principles on which that reputation is based.
Academic institutions, and law schools in particular, should
elaborate their principles of candor and openness to apply to quasi-thirdparty opinion practice. To start things off, I propose a basic norm. The
institutions should announce it as an aspiration to which all members are
51

Hazard’s opinion is reprinted in Practising Law Institute, The Attorney-Client
Relationship After Kaye Scholer 381-402 (1992). My critical characterization draws on
William H. Simon, “The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer’s Duty of Candor and the
Bar’s Temptations of Evasion and Apology,” 23 Law & Social Inquiry 243, 247-61
(1998).
52
When the American Lawyer criticized his opinion, Hazard vaguely distanced
himself from it, noting that it was “kind of preliminary.” Susan Beck and Michael
Orey, “They Got What They Deserved,” American Lawyer 67, 75 (1992). The
textbook of which Hazard is co-author conceded that the OTS charges were “at least as
strong” as those a federal court held sufficient to withstand summary judgment in a case
against another firm that represented Lincoln. Geoffrey C. Hazard et al, The Law and
Ethics of Lawyering 91 (2d ed. 1994). In his reply to my 1998 criticism, he indicated
that he was not aware what the precise factual allegations or charges were at the time
Kaye Scholer drafted its report of his opinion. Geoffrey C. Hazard, “The Duty or
Option of Silence,” 23 Law & Social Inquiry 339 (1998).
53
Id., at 339.
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expected to adhere. It could be enforced through criticism and shaming
without any formal disciplinary process. It could also be enforced more
formally and coercively, but I take no position on whether that would be
a good idea.54
Here is the basic norm: When an academic publicly expresses a
view as an expert or authorizes another to attribute an expert view to her,
she should take care that the view be publicly accessible and clearly and
accurately expressed, with its basis as fully stated as feasible. This duty
includes an obligation to clarify and revise public description of her view
as long as the view is the subject of public attention. The academic
should not make any private commitments incompatible with this
principle.
Exceptions may be made but only in compelling
circumstances, and they should be publicly documented to the extent
feasible.
The “as an expert” qualification is designed to exclude both
amateur opinions not associated with the academic’s field and views
expressed as a partisan advocate, as long as academic authority is not
invoked for them.
Under this norm, when the client goes public with the expert’s
opinion, the expert may not, without exceptional reasons, permit her to
do so selectively, as Wolfram has permitted with his Vinson & Elkins
opinion, or to control the public characterization of her views, as Hazard
has done with his Kaye Scholer opinion. She should make them as
readily accessible as possible. If she has substantial quasi-third party
practice, she should maintain a website on which to post her opinions.
It would be a challenging task to devise principles for deciding
when a client’s desire for confidentiality is sufficiently compelling to
warrant exceptions. For now, I merely note that it will often be possible
to accommodate the client’s need for confidentiality while making most
of the expert’s opinion accessible. Bar association ethics committees
and sometimes disciplinary bodies, for example, have long experience of
reporting opinions and decisions publicly in forms that conceal the
identity of the parties involved in the underlying case while giving a
detailed account of their factual bases.
54

My hesitation arises from awareness that important academic values
sometimes produce oppressive over-regulation. Human subjects review boards are a
notable example. See Philip Hamburger, “The New Censorship: Institutional Review
Boards,” 2004 Supreme Court Review 271.
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In the litigation context, we can acknowledge two problems that
will be encountered in implementing the principle, though neither
ultimately presents a serious objection to it.
First, there is the problem of drawing the line between first party
and quasi-third-party legal advice. In the ex ante situation, where the
client has not yet acted, the client often consults the lawyer for advice
about how she should proceed; then when the client decides on a course
of action, she may want to rely on the lawyer’s advice for support in the
event the conduct is later challenged. In the ex post situation, the client
is looking for exoneration. She consults the lawyer to find out what the
lawyer’s view would be, and plans to use the view only if it is
supportive. In either of these situations, it seems appropriate for the
lawyer to consider her role as a first-party legal advisor, subject to
normal confidentiality obligations, up to the point at which it becomes
highly probable that the client will rely publicly on the advice. At that
point, confidentiality with respect to all matters on which the advice is
based is no longer appropriate.55
The expert should not, without good reason, postpone disclosure
to accommodate the client’s strategic interests. Sometimes the client
may be content with prompt disclosure because it will strengthen its
claim of good faith in the event that its conduct is challenged. Often the
client will not be happy about early disclosure. The expert will then
have to evaluate the legitimacy of the client’s reasons. A desire to
minimize the chances of public discovery or scrutiny should not be a
sufficient reason unless the client has a plausible claim of privacy with
respect to the matter. Regulators may be able to pass rules tailored to
specific fields. For example, it would not be a radical step for the IRS to
add to its current regime a requirement that opinions can be used for

55

In the course of litigation, the client’s reliance on advice of counsel as a
defense usually constitutes a waiver of attorney-client privilege by “putting in issue”
the otherwise confidential communications, In re Echostar, 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir.
2006), and the decision to call an expert as a witness at trial opens his opinions to broad
discovery. Jack Weinstein et al., 2 Weinstein’s Evidence, par. 503(a)[3][01], and
sources cited at notes 17-18. The transparency principle recommended above just
generalizes these norms.
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penalty protection only if they have been made accessible to the IRS no
later than the filing of the relevant return.56
Second, the proposals are in strong tension with the conception of
the expert witness's role that prevails among litigators. This conception
virtually erases the distinction between expert and advocate. It applies to
witnesses the confidentiality and conflict-of-interest norms the bar
prescribes for partisan lawyers. It instructs the witness to develop her
opinions in private, consulting only the party who retained her and the
party's partisan advisors. And it tells her to avoid making records of her
preliminary thoughts. It forbids outside consultation and casual writing
in order to prevent later disclosures that might reduce strategically
advantageous surprise at trial or create opportunities for impeachment
with what turn out to be prior inconsistent statements.57
There are two problems with the litigators' view. First, it is
inconsistent with the premise on which the expert is presented to the
court, which is that the expert is disinterested and testifying to what she
genuinely believes to be the best answer to the question. Second, where
the expert is an academic or relies on academic credentials, it is
inconsistent with the premises of the academy as to how sound
understanding is achieved. These premises prescribe openness and the
continuous exchange of views among different perspectives. They treat
willingness to reconsider one's views as a sign of self-confidence and
integrity, rather than as the litigators' view it, of weakness or duplicity.
No wonder that many experts are confused about their roles.
They know they are supposed to be independent to some degree, but they
have trouble defining that degree, and they get little help from the
litigators. The economic pressures that arise from the fact that the client
is paying are reinforced in circumstances where the expert can discuss
her opinions and her role only with partisans.
Tension with the litigation culture is inevitable in any effort to
vindicate academic values with respect to quasi-third-party advice. But
academic standards could make a difference. Even without direct formal
enforcement, they might generate pressures through shaming within the
56

Current rules require or condition benefits on the disclosure of certain
transactions but generally don’t require advance disclosure of opinions. See note
above.
57
This conception is noted and criticized in Gross, cited in note ; and Harrison,
cited in note .
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academy. And courts could treat their violation as appropriate
impeachment in court.
III. A Case Study: Ethics Experts and Defendant Payments to
Plaintiffs’ Lawyers in Aggregate Litigation
A recent case involving settlement of aggregate litigation offers
further illustration of the problems of quasi-third party academic advice.
The settlement was negotiated in 2000 by the New York firm of Leeds,
Morelli & Brown (LM&B) on behalf of hundreds of employment
discrimination plaintiffs with the cell phone company Nextel. (Nextel
has since been merged into Sprint.) Former clients have sued LM&B for
malpractice and other misconduct in connection with the case. Other
lawsuits by former clients have alleged similar conduct by the firm in
group representations against four other employers.58
The Nextel case is important for both what it shows about
plaintiffs’ lawyer responsibility in aggregate litigation and what it shows
about the market for quasi-third-party opinions. The dispersion of
individual claimants in aggregate litigation and their relatively small
stakes raises concerns about the efficacy of traditional mechanisms of
lawyer-client accountability. With the class action, this concern has led
to distinctive supervisory procedures that often create roles for experts.
Notably, procedural rules require judicial certification of the adequacy of
class representation and the fairness of settlements, and counsel often
bring in experts to re-assure the court on such matters.59 Our case
involved, not a class action, but informally aggregated individual claims.
This procedure eluded the judicial scrutiny required for class actions, and
even the minimal accountability that arises from public filing.60
58

Ficklin v. Penguin Group USA, N.J.Super. Ct., Essex County, NO. ESX-L003765-03; Vaughn v. Leeds, Morelli & Brown (S.D.N.Y., Civil No. 04 CV 08391)
(Prudential Securities); Ganci v. Prudential Insurance Co. (N.J. Super. Ct., Bergen Co.,
Civil No. L-1806-05); Lee v. Leeds, Morelli & Brown (N.Y. Supreme Ct., Kings
County, No. 8651/05) (Bear Stearns).
59
FRCP 23(a),(e). A notable illustration of the role of experts can be found in
the district court opinion in Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 292310 (E.D.Pa. 1994); rev'd 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996); affi'd sub nom. Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (discussing the expert testimony of
Professors Geoffrey Hazard, Susan Koniak, Roger Cramton, and John Coffee).
60
See Erichson, cited in note above.
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Nevertheless, the lawyers involved, recognizing the possibility of later
challenge, called on academic experts for ex ante legitimation, and when
challenge emerged, retained further ex post expertise. The academics
responded in a manner that left unabated, and perhaps exacerbated, the
accountability problems inherent in the situation.
My views on this transaction are hotly disputed, but an important
purpose of my argument does not depend on whether I am right about
the merits. That purpose is to show that academic expertise can be quite
influential in high-stakes situations and that the form it takes and the
circumstances under which it is delivered are often not conducive to
reliability. The expert advice given in this case, especially a centrally
influential ex ante opinion by Geoffrey Hazard, involved striking
departures from the norms of analytical support and reasonable framing
discussed above. Moreover, the advice was given under conditions of
strong secrecy and thus (until now) largely immune from public and peer
scrutiny.61
61

I learned about the Nextel settlement as a consultant to plaintiffs’ counsel in
some of the cases arising from settlements negotiated by LM&B.
There have been three lawsuits against LM&B by former clients in the Nextel
matter. A class action in Colorado state court on behalf of all the original claimants
except about forty opt-outs was settled. Foster v. Leeds Morelli & Brown, Colorado
District Court, County of Arapahoe (No. 02-CV-1484). (Several of the Nextel
claimants were from Colorado, and LM&B opened an office in Colorado in the course
of the case.) The record of this case has been sealed, and no one is allowed to discuss
the terms of the settlement.
A second Colorado case was filed on behalf of two of the original clients who
opted out of the class action. McNeil v. Leeds, Morelli & Brown (Colorado District
Court, Denver County; No. 03CV893). I refer to this case below as "the Denver case".
The two claimants in the Denver case were distinctively situated because they had been
employed by LM&B to assist in communicating with other clients and (they say,
though the firm disputes it) soliciting new clients. A jury verdict in favor of the
defendants was returned after a trial in November, 2007.
The third case is a class action originally filed in New Jersey state court, but
after removal to federal court and interdistrict transfer, is now pending in the Southern
District of New York. Johnson v. Nextel (Civil No. 1:07-cv-08473-GBD). It seeks to
represent the remaining opt-out claimants against LM&B and to assert claims against
Nextel on behalf of all the original clients. I refer to this case below as "the federal
case."
I had no involvement in the Colorado class action. I have consulted informally
with plaintiffs' counsel in the federal case. I agreed to testify as an expert for the
plaintiff's in the Denver case but ultimately did not do so. (The court granted a defense
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A. Factual Background
Although there is much disagreement between LM&B and many
of their former clients, the facts that concern us are undisputed, with
some exceptions that I indicate below.
1. LM&B and its 587 Clients
Sometime prior to the beginning of 2000, LM&B signed up as
clients hundreds of people with employment discrimination claims
against Nextel. In the retainers I have seen, the firm undertook to
represent the client in a "labor action" and to contact Nextel "to seek a
negotiated settlement and, if necessary, the filing of a lawsuit regarding
your claims." The retainers provide that any recovery be divided onethird to the firm and two-thirds to the client.62
The firm filed more than 200 EEOC complaints against Nextel
and made various public pronouncements accusing the company of
discriminatory practices.63 Nextel responded in a June, 2000, press
motion to exclude me on the ground that pretrial disclosure of my testimony had been
inadequate. Plaintiff's counsel has stated that he had decided not to call me.)
Because the Colorado class action is sealed and there has been little discovery
in the federal case, the litigation opinions and much of the evidence I refer to come
from the Denver case. The circumstances of the two plaintiffs in that case were in
some respects unusual, but the opinions and evidence to which I refer apply to the
general experience of the great majority of claimants.
A few readers have expressed qualms about my carrying into the realm of
scholarship a debate I was invited to join as a litigation consultant or expert. My view
is that this practice is not only permissible (where not inconsistent with confidentiality
commitments), but desirable. In effect, I am treating my consulting role as an extension
of my academic one. And so I should. The idea that the two roles are continuous is
implied when the consulting expert's academic credentials are invoked as a token of
reliability. In reporting my views, I am subjecting them to the test of peer scrutiny that
the academy regards as critical to reliability. Continuity is also implied in the frequent
argument by academics that consulting benefits their academic work by putting them in
touch with practice. A large part of this benefit would be sacrificed if they felt
categorically barred from making the most effective use of their experience.
Finally, without suggesting that such refusal is either a necessary or a
sufficient condition of scholarly detachment, I report that I declined to take a fee for my
work on the matter.
62
Undated retainer agreements signed by Denise McNeil and Alencia AshtonMoore. Copies of all documents pertaining to LM&B and the Nextel case are on file
with the Stanford Law Review and are posted at www. [url]
63
Defendants Leeds, Morelli &Brown, P.C., Lenard Leeds, Steven Morelli,
Jeffrey Brown, James Vagnini and Bryan Mazzola's Supplemental Summary of Expert
Opinions Served Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26(a)(4) [hereafter "LM&B Supplemental
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release that LM&B had refused to discuss all but a few of the claims
until Nextel “captulat[ed] to exorbitant fee demands.”64
Negotiations resumed, and in September 2000, LM&B and
Nextel executed a "Dispute Resolution and Settlement Agreement"
(“DRSA”).
By this time, LM&B represented 587 people with
discrimination claims against Nextel.65 LM&B purported to sign the
agreement "on behalf of itself and the Claimants" (p.29).66 The
agreement is 29 double-spaced pages with about 20 pages of
attachments. Exhibit A to the DRSA is a three-page form "Individual
Agreement" intended for use by the claimants to assent to or ratify it.
2. The Aggregate Settlement Agreement (DRSA).
The agreement is not lucidly written and requires careful reading,
but the basic terms are undisputed.
a. LM&B agrees to deliver client agreements and to process
claims speedily.
The claimants waive their rights to pursue their claims in any
judicial or administrative forum, and specifically to bring a class action;
waive rights to punitive or injunctive relief, and agree to resolve the
claims in a specified alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) process.
(Par.s 5, 7(a), 7(e); Exhibit A, par.2) The process begins with an
exchange of information by each claimant and the company and then
proceeds, if necessary, through negotiation, mediation, and binding
arbitration. (Pp. 12-21) Nextel agrees to pay the “administrative fees” of
the process (specifically excluding the costs of expert advisors or
witnesses for the claimant). (7(f))
To begin the process, LM&B agrees “[a]s promptly as possible”
to deliver to Nextel signed "Individual Agreements" from its 587 clients
confirming their acceptance of the ADR procedure, along with
statements regarding their claims. (Par. 6) The firm also agrees to
deliver within two weeks requests or stipulations for dismissal of all
administrative complaints filed by any of the claimants. (Par. 7(f))
Disclosure"], at 3, 12, 19; Deposition of Stephen Morelli in the Denver case
(September 18, 2006), at 61.
64
The release appears at: http://phx.corporateir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=63347&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=99828&highlight= (visited
November 26, 2007). Hard copy on file.
65
Letter from Gregory Raiskin to Jeffrey K. Brown, August 29, 2001, p.1.
66
References to the DRSA are given as page or paragraph numbers in the text.
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LM&B acknowledges its understanding that, for Nextel, “time is
of the essence” with respect to the various deadlines set out in the
agreement. (Par. 1(c))
b. Nextel agrees to pay LM&B $7.5 million.
Nextel promises two forms of payment to LM&B. The payments
total $7.5 million, although the total does not appear in the agreement.
First, attorneys’ fees and expenses. Nextel agrees to pay $5.5
million to LM&B for attorneys' fees and otherwise unreimbursed
expenses of representing the claimants in the ADR process. The firm
gets $2 million within three business days after it has delivered to Nextel
signed and notarized "individual agreements" from "each claimant." It
then becomes entitled to $1.5 million more when half of the claims have
proceeded to resolution in the process, and the remaining $2 million
when all the claims have been resolved. (Par.s 11(a), 14) LM&B agrees
that all claims will be resolved within 45 weeks of the "effective date" of
the DRSA (basically, the date of the delivery of the individual
agreements). Nextel may deduct $50,000 from the final payment due
LM&B for each month after this deadline that any claims have not been
resolved or submitted to binding arbitration (with certain minor
exceptions). (Par. 11(b))
Second, the “consultancy.” On conclusion of the ADR process,
Nextel agrees to retain LM&B as a "legal consultant, with only such
duties and responsibilities as may be assigned to it by Nextel and which
may include assistance and legal advice with regard to the Companies'
anti-discrimination and diversity policies and programs." Nextel is to
pay LM&B $83,333.34 per month for 24 months (a total of $2 million,
though that figure does not appear in the document). (Par. 12)
c. LM&B agrees to refuse to represent or refer other claimants.
LM&B agrees not to represent any new clients with claims against
Nextel. This commitment is explained as a consequence of LM&B's
belief that "it is in the best interest of its clients that it devote its
resources" to the current claims. (Par. 1(c)) LM&B also agrees not to
refer anyone with claims against Nextel to other lawyers (or to accept
any fees for such referrals). This commitment is explained as a
consequence of LM&B's belief that "it is in the best interest of LM&B's
clients for the Company not to be distracted" by other claims. (Par. 2(c))
d. Clients are forbidden to discuss claims with each other or
anyone else except professional advisors.
The DRSA and the
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individual agreements provided that each claimant will not disclose
anything about the DRSA or her claim against Nextel to "any person"
except the claimant's "personal attorney or financial advisor, or expert
retained" for the purposes of the ADR process. In the event a claimant
makes a prohibited disclosure, he or she forfeits her right to
compensation (and must return any compensation received) and remains
bound by her waiver of judicial and administrative recourse. (Par. 4;
Exhibits A, D)
e. Clients are obliged to stay with LM&B, and LM&B is
prohibited from associating outside counsel.
The agreement provided that, “Each claimant agrees that LM&B
shall be his/her legal representative throughout DRP….” (Par. 7(a); Ex.
A, par 1) It also provides that LM&B may not retain any lawyer not
associated with the firm to represent or assist in representing any
Claimant. (Par. 11(a))
3. The Individual Agreements and the ADR Process.
a.. Most clients agree after consultation with LM&B.
By February 7, 2001, all but fourteen of the 587 claimants had
signed “individual agreement forms” accepting the DRSA. LM&B and
Nextel negotiated an amendment to the DRSA reducing LM&B’s fees
slightly to reflect the 14 non-consenting claimants.67
Discovery in the recent case against LM&B has focused on the
extent to which the lawyers informed their clients of the payment terms
of the DRSA.
LM&B invited the claimants to examine copies of the DRSA but
except for a small number of “representatives,” did not permit them to
retain copies. The lawyers prepared two documents for distribution to
clients -- the three-page “Individual Agreement” (Ex. A) that they signed
and another five-page document entitled “Highlights of the Settlement
Agreement with Nextel”.68 Neither of these documents mentioned the
amounts or conditions of the payments Nextel was to make to LM&B.
Both referred to the fact that Nextel had agreed to pay attorneys’ fees but
did not mention any conflict of interest in connection with this provision.
(One of these documents refers to the fees as sums “that claimants might
otherwise have to pay” [Ex. A, par. 3]; the other refers to Nextel’s
67

DRSA Amendment No. 2, dated February 7-8, 2001.
Deposition of James Vagnini in the Denver case (Sept. 20, 2006), at 53.
Highlights of the Settlement Agreement with Nextel, n.d.

68

31

Please cite to 60 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming)

promise to pay as “consideration” for the claimants’ agreement to accept
ADR.69) Both documents mention that Nextel planned to retain LM&B
after the conclusion of the ADR process and asked the claimants to
consent to the “conflict of interest” that such retention involved, but
neither said anything about the nature and effects of the conflict.70 (Ex.
A, par. 4)
Beyond these facts, there is dispute. The lawyers say that they
disclosed the amounts of the payments orally to the claimants and that
they went over the DRSA “line by line” orally with each claimant,
though it is not clear whether they claim to have done anything more
than describe the literal terms of the document.71 Some of their former
clients, however, have asserted they were not told of the amounts and
conditions of the payments, that they thought that the attorneys’ fee that
Nextel agreed to pay was the one-third contingency provided in their
retainers, or that they were told that the purpose of the consultancy was
to make sure that LM&B could continue to protect them against
discrimination by Nextel after the ADR process was over.72
b. Claims are “resolved.”
Apparently, LM&B was able eventually to bring its clients’
claims to sufficient resolution to receive the final attorneys’ fee payment
under the DRSA and to undertake the “consultancy”. LM&B and Nextel
have refused to describe the nature of the work that LM&B has
performed.
c. Aftermath. Some of LM&B’s former clients have sued them,
complaining, inter alia, that they did not agree to the payment provisions
and that they were induced by LM&B to waive rights and settle claims
against Nextel for less than their value.
B. The Ethics Experts
Nextel asked Geoffrey Hazard for his opinion on the DRSA
before it and LM&B signed the agreement. Hazard gave a four-page

69

Id. at par.29.
Id. at par. 30.
71
Vagnini deposition, at 53-61; Morelli deposition, at 38-39.
72
Deposition of Denise McNeil in the Denver case (July 6, 2006), at I; 92-95;
Deposition of Alencia Ashton-Moore in the Denver case (November 16, 2005), at I: 7283, 120-21; 251-55; Complaint in the federal (originally New Jersey) case (October 23,
2006), at par.s 28-57.
70
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written opinion, which is reprinted here as Appendix II. Nextel showed
it to LM&B.73
Hazard refers to the DRSA in very general terms. He mentions
the provision for Nextel to pay attorneys’ fees and expenses but does not
refer to the amounts of the fees or their conditions. He refers to the fees
and expenses as sums “the Claimants would otherwise be obligated to
pay” LM&B. (P.2) He also mentions the “consultancy”, but again, there
is no mention of its conditions or the amount of compensation. Hazard
notes that the “engagement could benefit present and future Nextel
employees … by providing objective and experienced guidance in the
company’s handling of employee relations.” (P.2)
Hazard then goes on to express the following opinions:
-- There is no violation of the prohibition on restrictions of
practice. Professional responsibility rules generally forbid lawyers to
propose or enter “an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s
right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between private
parties.”74 Hazard opines that the provision in the DRSA precluding
LM&B from representing or referring other claimants does not violate
this rule. As explanation, he says that “representation of Claimants
under the Agreement could well constitute a conflict of interest with
other potential clients” and that DRSA contemplates “continuing
cooperative procedures between Leeds Morelli and Nextel that could be
jeopardized” by new claims. (P.3)
-- Conflicts can be cured by informed consent. Professional
responsibility rules preclude a lawyer from proceeding when a
representation may be “materially limited” by the lawyer’s own interests
unless two conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the lawyer
must “reasonably believe that the relationship will not be adversely
affected” by the conflict. When this condition is satisfied, the conflict is
said to be “consentable”. The remaining condition is informed consent,
or as the rule puts it, “consent… after consultation”.75
73

LM&B Supplemental Disclosure, at 28; Deposition in the Denver case of Roy
Simon (October 19, 2006e), at 18..
74
Model Rule 5.6(b).
75
Model Rule 1.7(b). Hazard also opines that the payment provision does not
violate Model Rule 1.8(f) which says that a lawyer may not accept payment from
someone other than the client unless “the client consents after consultation” and there is
“no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment.” Since the
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Hazard opines without explanation that the conflict presented by
the payment provisions is “consentable.” He further states that
“informed consents should be obtained” but does not discuss what
informed consent would involve other than to say it must be “adequate”
and to note, “It is not obligatory that consent of the claimants … be in
writing, except in a few jurisdictions such as California.” He states
further, “I assume that LM&B will provide such disclosure.” (P.3)
-- The commitment of clients to stay with LM&B is not legally
enforceable. A basic principle of professional responsibility holds that
the client is always free to discharge the lawyer.76 Responding to the
DRSA provision that commits the clients to stay with LM&B, Hazard
says, “The Claimants can make such a commitment on a moral basis but
it is not legally binding.” (P.4)
At about the same time that Nextel consulted Hazard, LM&B
consulted Roy Simon. Simon did not put his opinion in writing, but we
know that he concluded, as Hazard did, that any conflict problems
associated with the fee provision or the “consultancy” could be cured by
informed consent.77
In a 2003 ABC news story – the only major media coverage of
the case to date – Nextel was reported as responding to allegations by
former LM&B clients that the DRSA had “sold them out” that “the
agreement had been reviewed and approved by a nationally-known
ethics expert.”78
In connection with one of the lawsuits by former LM&B clients,
Nextel retained, in addition to Hazard, a practitioner professional
responsibility expert, and LM&B retained, in addition to Roy Simon,
Bruce Green and a practitioner expert. In the lengthy written pre-trial
disclosure of the testimony of these experts in one of the pending cases,79
issues presented by this rule are virtually the same as those presented by Rule 1.7(b), I
do not discuss them separately.
76
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers 31, Comment d.
77
Roy Simon deposition, at 11-22.
78
Story by Sarah Wallace, WABC-TV (New York), November 4, 2003. (DVD
copy on file with author).
79
References to the experts pretrial opinions are to the following documents in
the Denver case: (1) Defendant Nextel Communications, Inc.s Supplemental C.R.C.P.
26(a)(2)(B)(I) and (II) Expert Witness Disclosures [hereafter "Nextel Disclosure"]; (2)
Defendants Leeds, Morelli & Brown, P.C., Lenard Leeds, Steven Morelli, Jeffrey
Brown, James Vagnini and Bryan Mazzola's Expert Endorsement Pursuant to C.R.C.P.

34

Please cite to 60 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming)

Hazard re-affirmed his opinion;80 the four other experts agreed with
Hazard on most or all of the conclusions expressed in his letter, and none
indicated disagreement with him on anything.81 In addition, Roy Simon,
Green, and the practitioner experts, on the basis of some assumed
version of the defendants’ story, opined that LM&B’s disclosure to its
clients was adequate for informed consent.82 And they opined that $5.5
million was a reasonable fee for the work that LM&B engaged to
perform.83
A notable feature of the ex post litigation opinions is the way
they build on the authority of Hazard’s and Roy Simon’s ex ante
opinions. Three experts state that it was “appropriate” for Nextel and
LM&B to seek ethics advice prior to entering into the DRSA.84 (No one
disputes that point, but clearly the defendants plan to remind the jury of
these consultations as often as possible.) Some go further and suggest
that the ex ante opinions have weight on substantive questions. Bruce
Green opines that the fact that Nextel “retained Professor Hazard to
review the DRSA as well [i.e., in addition to LM&B’s retention of Roy
Simon] was an additional basis for [LM&B] to conclude that the DRSA
was appropriate and ethical.”85 LM&B’s practitioner expert goes even
farther, contending that Roy Simon’s opinion is “evidence” of
consentability and that “because [Nextel] retained Professor Hazard to

26(a)(2)(b) [hereafter "LM&B Disclosure"]; (3) LM&B Supplemental Disclosure, cited
in note ; and (4) Defendants Leeds Morelli & Brown', P.C., Lenard Leeds, Steven
Morelli, Jeffrey Brown, James Vagnini and Bryan Mazzola's Second Supplemental
Summary of Expert Opinions Served Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26(a)(4) [hereafter "LM&B
Second Supplemental Disclosure"].
80
Nextel disclosures at 7.
81
Agreement with Hazard: Nextel disclosure, at 4-6 (Richard Hennessey);
LM&B Disclosure, at 3 (Roy Simon, 5-6 (Bruce Green), LM&B Supplemental
Disclosure, at 7-8 (Roy Simon); LM&B Supplemental Disclosure, at 23-29 (Jean
Dubofsky).
82
Informed consent: Nextel disclosures, at 5 (Hennessey); LM&B Supplemental
Disclosure, at 8 (Roy Simon); LM&B Supplemental Disclosure, at 17 (Green); LM&B
Supplemental Disclosure, at 25-26 (Dubofsky).
83
Fee: Nextel Disclosures, at 4-5 (Hennessey); 7 (Dubofsky); LM&B
Supplemental Disclosure, at 9 (Roy Simon); LM&B Supplemental Disclosure, at 26
(Dubofsky).
84
Nextel disclosure, at 3 (Roy Simon), 6 (Green), 7 (Dubofsky).
85
Second Supplemental Disclosure, at 16.
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review the DRSA as well, it was reasonable for LM&B to conclude that
the DRSA was appropriate and ethical.”86
On two issues, the practitioner experts seem to rest their views
largely or entirely on Hazard’s opinion. Nextel’s practitioner expert
gives Hazard’s opinion as a reason why the prohibition on representation
of other clients was permissible.87 Concluding that the consultancy
agreement was not a prohibited restriction on practice, LM&B’s
practitioner expert gives as the only basis for her opinion the fact that
Hazard said it was not.88
C. Critique
It should be sufficient to raise doubts about both the practitioner
and the academic practices involved in this case to point out some salient
deficiencies in Hazard’s written opinion and to make a few specific
comments about Green’s and Roy Simon’s contributions. One reason to
focus on Hazard is that his opinion has been most influential. Another is
that it is a self-contained statement, intended and used as a basis for
practical decision. By contrast, I know the other experts’ views only
from summaries of their anticipated trial testimony. Although these
summaries are each considerably longer than Hazard’s opinion, they are
not exhaustive.89
86

LM&B Supplemental Disclosure, at 23.
Doctrine suggests that reliance of advice of another has at most limited bearing
in determining whether a lawyer has fulfilled professional responsibilities. See Model
Rule 5.2(b) (“subordinate lawyer” does not violate rules if she acts in accordance with
supervisor’s “reasonable resolution" of an arguable professional duty); Florida Bar v.
St. Louis, 2007 WL 1285836 (May 3, 2007) (rejecting advice of counsel defense to bar
disciplinary charges); People v. Katz, 58 P..2d 1176, 1187 (Colorado P.D.J. 2002)
(same).
87
Nextel disclosure, at 6.
88

Ms. Dubofsky will explain that Nextel retained Geoffrey Hazard to evaluate and
opine upon the ethical implications of the consultancy arrangement with LM&B,
that Professor Hazard concluded that the arrangement was ethical, and that LM&B
reviewed his written opinion before entering the provisions. Ms. Dubofsky will
opine that under these circumstances, the DRSA’s consulting provision is ethical
and appropriate, and within the standard of care for lawyers practicing in
Colorado in 2000.
LM&B's Supplemental Disclosure, at 28. Hennessey also gives strong weight to
Hazard's opinion in this issue. Nextel disclosures, at 5.
89
Roy Simon and Green testified at the trial in the Denver case in November,
2007, that resulted in a verdict for defendants. I have not seen any reports of their
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1. Conflicts
a. The Elephant in the Room
Hazard’s opinion is patently wrong on nearly every issue it
addresses, but its most remarkable feature – shared by the opinions of the
four other experts – is its complete silence on the nature of the conflict
created by the payment arrangements of the DRSA. The DRSA was
extraordinary in two respects. First, the plaintiffs’ lawyers concluded
negotiation of compensation for themselves from their clients’ adversary
without even beginning to negotiate relief for their clients.90 Second, the
compensation they negotiated did not depend on either the lawyers’
efforts or their results.
One way to start thinking about the two requirements of the
conflict of interest rule – consentability and consent – is to ask: if this
conflict were consentable, what kind of disclosure would have to be
made to the client? The most important section of any adequate
disclosure of the DRSA would go something like this:
The DRSA provides for Nextel to make payments to us totaling
$7.5 million. In order to earn this money, we do not have to achieve any
particular result for you. What we have to do to get paid is, first, to
persuade you and the other claimants to accept the DRSA, and second,
to get your claim and the others resolved in the ADR procedure in
accordance with deadlines set down by Nextel As long as we get the
claims resolved in time, we get paid regardless of whether you get a
large award or whether you default and get nothing (and under the
procedure, you can default if, for example, you miss a meeting without
an excuse).
We get our first $2 million from Nextel when we deliver signed
individual agreements from every one of you. The DRSA permits Nextel
testimony. Hazard did not testify because the claims against Nextel had been dismissed
prior to the trial.
90
Courts that have considered the practice of simultaneously negotiating
recovery and fees have accepted it only with discomfort and qualification. For
example, a notable decision says that the “better practice” is to negotiate recovery
before discussing fees and that simultaneously negotiated settlements should be
subjected to “careful scrutiny.” Cisek v. National Surface Cleaning,Inc., 954 F. Supp.
110, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). That was a class action, and thus the court’s approval was
required for settlement. Our case – where the fees were negotiated before the recovery
– involved informal aggregation of claims that were never filed in court, and hence
there was no opportunity for any kind of public scrutiny.
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to deny us all payment if we fail to persuade any of you to accept the
DRSA.91 So when we counsel you about whether to accept the DRSA, we
will have a $7.5 million stake in getting you to agree. Although we will
do our best to exercise independent judgment in your interests, there is a
risk that this financial interest will affect our advice.
After the $2 million we receive when everyone agrees to the
DRSA, we get $1.5 million when half of the claims have been resolved,
and another $2 million when all claims have been resolved. When all
the claims have been resolved, Nextel is going to hire us to work for it
for two years and pay us $2 million more. We will be doing whatever
work they assign us, and it will not necessarily be in your interest.
The DRSA provides that all claims should be resolved within 45
weeks of the start of the process. If we fail to meet this deadline, Nextel
can reduce payments to us, and it is possible it could decline to hire us
and pay us the final $2 million.
If you accept the DRSA, we will make our best efforts to pursue
your claims zealously and to exercise independent judgment in advising
you on whether to accept settlement offers and in preparing your case.
However, since it requires less effort and expense for us to settle quickly
than to prepare, negotiate, and try your case, and since every time we
turn down a settlement offer, we increase the risk of missing the deadline
and incurring a large financial loss, there is a risk that our advice and
strategic decisions will be affected by our financial interests.
b. Consentability
All of the defense experts say the conflict was consentable, but
none of them say a word about what standards they apply for this
judgment. Their silence does not reflect the existence of standards too
well known to require mention. In fact, there is little authority on when a
conflict is consentable. However, there can be no doubt that some
arrangements are not consentable (at least in all jurisdictions relevant to
this case). This case seems an especially good candidate for nonconsentability.
91

As things turned out, Nextel agreed to accept LM&B’s tender of 573 consents
in return for LM&B’s agreement to lower its fee to reflect the 14 hold outs. DRSA,
Amendment 2. LM&B might have anticipated that Nextel would accept consents from
less than all the claimants, but it could not have been sure of any such leniency – the
concession required negotiation of an amendment to the DRSA -- and it seems unlikely
that failure with respect to more than a small fraction would be excused.
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The most critical considerations are these:
The alignment between lawyer incentives and client interests is
especially bad. All compensation arrangements involve conflicts
between lawyer and client interests, but the divergence here is much
worse than with the percentage contingency of the original deal.
Further, the arrangement is highly unusual. 92 The customary use
of an arrangement in a particular context suggests similarly situated
clients have decided that it is a good thing. A non-customary
arrangement lacks this reassurance.
In addition, the benefits are hard to assess (or even perceive).
What did the claimants get for giving up the one-third contingency and
accepting the much worse incentives of the fixed fee? The disclosure
documents implied that the fee provision was a boon to the claimants
because it relieved them of the obligation to pay the fee themselves out
of their recoveries.93 However, under their original agreement, the
claimants would have been compensated for this expense by the statutory
fee award that successful discrimination plaintiffs receive.94 In any
event, the assertion that the claimants benefited by being relieved of their
fee obligation merely raises the question of why Nextel would not have
been willing to pay fees based on a percentage of the recoveries.95 It’s
92

Flat-rate compensation is not unknown, but in the civil sphere it is usually
found in situations involving either (1) routine transactions, such as uncontested
divorces or consumer bankruptcies, or (2) situations where there is a long-term relation
between sophisticated business clients and their lawyers.
93
DRSA, Ex. A, par 3. Green asserts that the fee arrangement was "a benefit to
LM&B's clients" for this reason. LM&B's Supplemental Summary, at 17.
94
See e.g., 56 U.S.C. 2305(a). Unless the agreement specifies otherwise, fee
awards go entirely to the client, and the contingency fee percentage is applied only to
the damage award. Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers sec. 38, Comment (d).
The agreements (retainers) with LM&B that I (and presumably, Green and Roy Simon)
have seen did not specify otherwise.
95
Roy Simon does make a response to this query, but it seems more a
hypothetical debating point than a reasoned conclusion:
Professor Simon will explain to the jury the positive effect on an adversary such
as Nextel in terms of a 'cap' on attorneys' fee exposure and how such an
arrangement can result in higher settlements paid to claimants.
LM&B's Supplemental Summary, at 8.
As opposed to the alternative of Nextel agreeing to pay the one-third attorneys'
fee contingency of the original retainers, capping attorneys' fees but not damages
eliminated the variance with respect to only a quarter of the expected value of Nextel's
exposure. Even if Nextel was so risk averse that it valued this trivial reduction in risk --
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an even larger mystery what the claimants got for agreeing to accept the
perverse incentives of the consultancy arrangement. The only possible
answer is that they got Nextel’s agreement to the ADR process, but the
process seems at least as much in Nextel’s interest as in the claimants’.
Finally, the clients were legally unsophisticated, and it thus
seems appropriate to apply the paternalistic constraints that the rule
clearly contemplates to them.
An adequate analysis of consentability should also take account
of four other features of the agreement that exacerbated the risks created
by the skewed incentives. First, the confidentiality provisions meant
there would be no publicity about the results. A substantial motivation
for lawyers is often the desire to enhance their reputations through
reports of successful representation, and conversely, to avoid injury to
reputation by reports of bad practice. This motivation could not operate
here.
Second, the confidentiality provisions precluded the claimants
from talking to each other. Thus, they could not compare results or talk
about concerns they had about their lawyers. This removed for each
client a major source of information that would otherwise have been
available to assist in assessing the lawyers’ performance.
Third, two unusual features of the agreement reduced the
likelihood that a professional less beholden than LM&B to Nextel would
intervene on behalf of the claimants. The fee provision required LM&B
to bear the expense out of its own compensation of any expert witness
for the claimant and thus created a strong disincentive to bringing one in.

which seems highly unlikely in the case of a company sold for $35 billion in 2005 -- it
is hard to see how it could have compensated the claimants for it. It did not agree to
pay any minimum amount to the claimants in the DRSA, and once the DRSA was
concluded, it had no incentive to offer any further concessions.
Roy Simon makes one more, equally implausible argument for claimant
benefit:
Professor Simon will explain how the [flat rate] arrangement greatly benefits a
client and allows the lawyer to focus on the merits of the client’s claims rather
than have concern over compensation for the lawyers themselves.
LM&B's Supplemental Summary, at 8.
All payment arrangements “allow” the lawyer to focus on the client’s claims; the
objection to the flat rate is that it minimizes his material interest in doing so.
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Another provision forbade LM&B from bringing in any lawyers from
outside the firm to work on the cases.
Fourth, resort to ADR precluded review of the results by a public
official. Had the claims been asserted in a class action, a settlement
would have been likely to require approval by a judge or public official.
By inducing the claimants’ to waive their rights to class actions, the
DSRA required them to give up this safeguard.
These four concerns would not have created insuperable conflict
problems by themselves.
However, they increased the clients’
dependence on their lawyers’ loyalty and capacity for independent
judgment, just as the financial provisions of the DRSA were
undermining that capacity.
In failing to explain its conclusion about consentability, Hazard's
opinion violates the norm requiring analytical support.
c. Consent After Consultation
I have already suggested the most important component of
disclosure that would have been necessary. There are strong indications
that such disclosure was not given. The written documents prepared for
client disclosure do not mention the amount or conditions of the
payments and contain no discussion of conflicts other than a conclusory
reference with respect to the consultancy. Claimants in the actions
against LM&B alleged that such disclosure was never given.
Unfortunately, the record is unclear as to what the lawyers claim to have
said orally because both their testimony on this point and the
characterizations of their exonerating experts describe the oral
consultation only in conclusory terms, such as “line-by-line,” and “in
detail.” Nevertheless, without getting into the factual disputes, we can
make the following points about the experts’ performance on this issue.
Hazard’s letter simply assumes the issue away, noting that there
must be informed consent, but saying nothing about what it should
involve. Surely, this was not because Hazard thought the required
disclosure obvious. Hazard knows that “in the process of obtaining
informed consent, the lawyer or law firm must do more than merely
disclose the relevant facts; it must evaluate and analyze the conflict and
advise the party of the wisdom of consenting.”96 Aside from the issue of
96

Geoffrey C. Hazard and William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering 10-23 (3d ed.

2000).
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consentability, the issue of required disclosure was the most difficult
issue and the issue with the greatest practical stakes that was presented
by Nextel’s inquiry.
Yet, Hazard had only one thing to say about it: “It is not
obligatory that the consents of the claimants be in writing…” (P. 3) This
was true, but, as the letter noted, irrelevant because the lawyers intended
to get consent in writing. Hazard ignored the more important question of
whether the disclosure necessary to effective consent should have been
in writing. The rule does not require written disclosure invariably, but it
does require whatever disclosure is necessary “to permit the client to
appreciate the significance of the matter in question.”97 Where the
material is as complicated as it is here, that standard would require
written disclosure.98
Hazard violated the norm of reasonable framing by ignoring the
key issues regarding consent, and by emphasizing the rule’s flexibility
on an irrelevant issue, he sent the wrong signal. He had seen documents
suggesting a reluctance to come clean about the payment arrangements.
(Recall that the DRSA never mentions the total payments and that the
Individual Agreement form in the appendix contains no numbers at all or
any explanation of payment conditions.) Telling the lawyers that the rule
is flexible about whether consents have to be in writing was like telling a
drunk getting into the driver’s seat that he’s allowed to turn right on a red
light – true, but not the message he needs to hear.
Finally, to show how easily expertise can lapse into advocacy, I
note that both Roy Simon and Bruce Green opine that it was sufficient
disclosure simply to permit the claimants to examine a copy of the (50Surely this is an eccentric
page, obscurely written) DRSA.99
understanding of “consultation.”
2. Other Issues
97

ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Terminology (“Consultation”).
Model Rule 1.5(b) – not mentioned by Hazard – provides that “the basis or
rate of the fee” should be communicated to a new client “preferably in writing.”
98

99

Professor Green will opine that the fact that Plaintiffs personally received a
copy of the DRSA that they were able to review before they attended their
mediations, depositions, prepared for arbitrations, and before they executed their
general releases, amounts to full disclosure.
LM&B Supplemental Summary, at 17. This view is attributed to Roy Simon
in identical language at 8.
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Not all of the following issues are practically important in the
case at hand, but I include them as further illustrations of the effects of
market and adversarial pressures on putatively neutral judgment. With
respect to each issue, Hazard failed either to provide analytical support
or to frame reasonably.
1. Reasonableness of the fee.
Hazard ignored the issues presented by the DRSA of compliance
with the rule that requires that “[a] lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable” and
that the basis of the fee be disclosed to the client.100 The four other
litigation experts all opine that $5.5 million was a reasonable fee for
LM&B’s work, citing the LM&B lawyers’ experience and the number of
hours they claim to have spent on the case.101
However, they do not mention a serious problem with such a
claim. It is virtually unheard of to assess the reasonableness of a fee for
representation in a civil damage action without any knowledge of either
the expected value of the claims or the actual recovery. Yet, it appears
that the experts do not have this information because the lawyers have
been intent on keeping it secret. The experts do not know whether the
attorneys’ fee represents 10 percent of the amount LM&B expected to or
did recover for their clients or 10 times that amount. Surely, under the
circumstances their opinions cannot be taken seriously.
At the time the DRSA was presented, a similar problem affected
disclosure to the clients.
The fee was an aggregate sum for
representation of all 587 claims. In order to assess its reasonableness (if
it had been disclosed), the clients would have needed some sense of the
expected aggregate value of the claims. Yet, not only were the clients
not provided with any information about claims other than their own,
they were forbidden to seek such information. Accordingly, the fee
arrangement should be considered unreasonable in form because it did
not permit the clients to make a meaningful decision about the
reasonableness of its amount.
2. The clients’ commitment to stay with LM&B.
The DRSA provided that, “Each claimant agrees that LM&B
shall be his/her legal representative throughout the” ADR process. (Par.
7(a); Ex. A, par 1) Hazard notes that this is inconsistent with the
100
101

Model Rule 1.5(a),(b).
See note above.
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principle that client is always free to discharge the lawyer. He then says
only: “The Claimants can make such a commitment on a moral basis but
it is not legally binding.” (P.4) Hazard nowhere mentions the lawyers’
duty to “fairly disclose the client’s alternatives” with respect to choice of
counsel.102 Indeed the knowing inclusion of unenforceable terms in
contracts has been held unlawful deception even in arm’s length
relations.103
3. The agreement not to accept or refer other claims.
Hazard opined that the DRSA provision prohibiting LM&B from
representing or referring other claimants did not violate the rule against
agreement to a “restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice [as] part of
the settlement of a controversy between private parties.”104 Hazard
explained that the additional representation “could” involve a prohibited
conflict. (P.3)
In fact, there was no reason to presume that additional
representation would involve a conflict,105 and even if such a conflict
were certain, Hazard’s conclusion would not follow. Rule 5.6(b) makes
no exception for situations where the agreement to restrict practice
would have no practical effect because the practice in question would be
independently prohibited. If it had been clear that the conflicts rules
would prohibit LM&B from representing or referring other claimants,
there would have been no point to the DRSA restriction. The only
possible point of the DRSA restriction was to assure Nextel that, should
it prove otherwise permissible for LM&B to represent or refer future

102

ABA Standing Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, F.
Op. 99-414.
103
E.g., Leardi v. Brown, 394 Mass. 151, 156-57 (1985).
104
Model Rule 5.6(b)
105
As support for this claim, Hazard offered only citations to Ortiz v. Fibreboard,
Inc., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); and Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591
(1997). Neither case has any clear relevance to the Nextel situation. In both, the
conflicts concerns arose because clients were differently situated in substantive or
strategic terms (for example, clients with present as opposed to only potential future
claims; class member clients v. individual claimants), and in both there was at least a
background concern that the assets available to satisfy the claims were limited so that
the gains of one group would only come at the expense of another. In our case, there
was no reason to think that new claimants would be differently situated or that their
claims would affect the amount available for LM&B’s original clients.
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claimants against it, the firm would refuse to do so. Such assurance is
precisely what the rule is designed to prohibit.
Hazard also says, “the Agreement contemplates continuing
cooperative procedures between LM&B that could be jeopardized if the
law firm pursued litigation on terms inconsistent with the Agreement.”
(P.3) Is this any different from arguing that “the agreement does not
violate the rule because enforcement of the rule would be inconsistent
with the agreement”? In any event, the reference to “collaborative
procedures between LM&B and Nextel” as something deserving an
exemption from the usual requirements should send a chill down the
spine of anyone more sensitive to the dangers posed by this collaboration
to LM&B’s clients.
4. The “consultancy” as a restriction on practice
As we have seen, the main problem with the “consultancy” is that
by negotiating a future engagement with the client’s adversary before
negotiating the clients’ claims, LM&B created a huge conflict of interest.
But the agreement is also arguably a “restriction on the lawyer’s right to
practice” prohibited by Model Rule 5.6(b). This is one issue on which
LM&B’s position is defensible, but I mention it because it involves an
interesting question.
The usual rationale for the rule is a kind of public utility principle
that holds that the lawyer should not without good reason limit his
availability to people in need of legal services. There also seems to be a
notion that it is unjust and perhaps extortion-like for the lawyer or even
the lawyer’s current client to take money in return for the lawyer not
asserting claims against the payor.106
It is an interesting issue whether the rule is violated when, instead
of agreeing not to bring claims against the adversary in the future, the
lawyer agrees to represent the adversary in the future. Such provisions
are common and have been held permissible as part of the settlement of
the original client’s claims (though not before settlement of these
claims).107 The rationale for allowing them is that the rule is not
106

See ABA F. Op. 93-371 (1993) (noting that one purpose of the rule is to
prevent “the use of such agreements to provide clients with rewards that bear less
relationship to the merits of the case than they do to the desire of the defendant to ‘buy
off’ plaintiff’s counsel’). For discussion, see Luban, cited in note , at
107
Compare Stephen Gillers, "Free the Lawyers: A Proposal to Permit No-Sue
Promises in Settlement Agreements," 18 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 291
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intended to prohibit limitations of practice that arise by virtue of
representation.
Of course, the objection to this view is that the effect of such
agreements is similar to an outright restriction. Once the lawyer
represents the (now former) adversary, he will be conflicted out of
adverse representations. In most cases, it seems unlikely that the
adversary has any other purpose in retaining the plaintiffs’ lawyer.
Plaintiffs’ and defense bars in the tort and employment areas are quite
specialized, and businesses rarely retain plaintiffs’ lawyers under other
circumstances. Indeed, one of LM&B’s experts candidly expresses her
understanding that Nextel’s reason for entering into the “consultancy”
was to preclude LM&B from further adverse representations.108
Many lawyers are untroubled by these provisions, even though
broadly permitting them would virtually nullify the prohibition against
restrictions on practice in settlements. They are not troubled by
nullification because they see the policies behind the rule as weak. The
idea of the lawyer as a public utility seems anachronistic or Utopian to
them. Moreover, they take the view that was until recently a dogma
among federal judges that any practice that promotes settlement carries a
large presumption of legitimacy. And they emphasize how difficult it
would be to enforce a rule that turned on the motivation of the initially
adverse party in asking for the arrangement.
My view is that the policies behind the rule are at least strong
enough to support an interpretation that would preclude the lawyer from
negotiation of subsequent retention with an adversary until after the
conclusion of the initial representation.109 This interpretation would be
desirable independently on conflicts grounds, would not be hard to
apply, and would screen out some pretextual agreements. It would
impede settlement only where settlement would be likely to violate the
policies of the rule – that is, where settlement is possible only where the
defendant offers terms that reflect, not just her valuation of the plaintiffs’
claims, but also the deterrence of future claims.
(2005), (criticizing rule), with David A. Dana and Susan P. Koniak, "Secret Settlements
and Practice Restrictions Aid Lawyer Cartels and Cause Other Harms," 2003 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 1217, 1222-24 (defending rule).
108
Defendant’s Supplemental Summary, at 28.
109
This position was adopted in In re Conduct of Brandt, 10 P.3d 906, 919-20
(Or. 2000).
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It would not have been unreasonable for Hazard to reject this
view, but a responsible appraisal of the DRSA would have at least
addressed it.
IV. Conclusion
The defining characteristics of quasi-third-party legal advice –
the absence of a strong duty of care to the ultimate addressees and
secrecy – create a market for bad legal advice. Of course, the market
does not invariably produce bad advice, but it consistently encourages
bad advice.
The market for bad legal advice is a problem for professional and
academic morality. Professional responsibility norms are designed to
encourage demand for and reliance on legal advice by prescribing
safeguards that deter bad advice. However, these norms have largely
been pre-occupied with first party advice, and to a smaller extent,
traditional explicit third-party advice. However, quasi-third-party advice
involves the kinds of stakes that have traditionally motivated
professional regulation. The advisor invokes the authority of the
profession to encourage reliance that has public consequences. The
social value of good legal advice is usually understood in terms of
enforcement or vindication of law. Bad advice tends to impair
enforcement and vindication and to undermine the status and authority of
the profession.
When academics give quasi-third-party advice, there is a parallel
problem for the academy. Academic norms focus on conduct with
respect to scholarship. Quasi-third-party advice usually does not take the
form of scholarship.
However, it characteristically invokes the
reputation of the University in order to encourage public reliance, and
this reliance often has significant public consequences. Quasi-thirdparty practice is thus in tension with academic norms holding that
openness, and especially exposure to peer criticism, is a fundamental
safeguard of the soundness conclusions.
Among several possible responses to these problems, the most
promising focus on norms of transparency. Transparency could be
imposed in the form of conditions on desired third-party effects, or it
could be imposed as academic or professional practice rules. The article
leaves open the question of whether formal, coercive enforcement would
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be desirable. Even enforced only through informal criticism and
shaming, professional and academic transparency requirements could
have significant effects.
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[Transcribed]
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM
CHARLES FRANK KRAVIS SR.
CORNELL LAW SCHOOL
10_ MYRON TAYLOR HALL
ITHACA, NEW YORK 14853

TELEPHONE: (607) 255-9668
TELECOPIER: (607) 255-7193

March 13, 2002
John K. Villa, Esq.
Williams & Connolly LLP
725 Twelfth Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005-5901
Dear Mr. Villa:
I have been asked for my opinion on the question whether Vinson & Elkins acted
appropriately in undertaking for Enron a preliminary investigation of the concerns raised
by an Enron employee, Sherron Watkins. I enclose my professional resume. In my
opinion, Vinson & Elkins acted both properly and ethically, At your request, I am basing
my opinion on the facts set forth in the “Powers Report” (the Report of the Special
Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron) and in Vinson & Elkins’ report of its
investigation by letter of October 15, 2001.
Ms. Watkins recommended in a letter to CEO Ken Lay that Enron conduct an
independent legal and accounting investigation of a number of allegations. She
suggested that Vinson & Elkins not be hired to conduct the investigation because, as she
believed, the law firm had provided “true sale” opinions in some of the transactions that
she thought should be investigated.
A corporate investigation utilizing independent counsel and an independent auditing firm
is a major undertaking. A corporation does not necessarily undertake a full scale
independent investigation each time an employee raises a complaint about corporate
conduct or the propriety of the corporation’s accounting. Before initiating such an
independent investigation, it is customary and appropriate for a corporation to conduct a
preliminary inquiry to determine whether such an independent investigation is warranted.
From my review of Vinson & Elkins’ report of October 15, 2001 and the Powers Report,
it is clear that the law firm undertook and conducted a preliminary inquiry and not the
type of full independent investigation that Ms Watkins requested, and that such an
inquiry was precisely what its client, Enron, had requested.
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The standard for determining whether Vinson & Elkins could undertake such a
preliminary investigation was whether the law firm had a conflict of interest under the
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. To answer that question, it is
necessary to examine the specific issues that Enron asked Vinson & Elkins to investigate.
The Powers Report states that Ms. Watkins “raised serious questions concerning the
accounting treatment and economic substance” of certain transactions, p. 172. According
to CEO Lay, as noted in the Powers Report, Ms. Watkins’ major focus was Raptor, a
series of transactions on which Enron faced an impending credit problem in 2002 and
2003. As quoted in the Powers Report, Ms. Watkins’ letter also stated that “Enron has
been very aggressive in its accounting – most notably in the Raptor transactions.”
Powers Report p. 172 (quoting letter).
The purpose of Vinson & Elkins’ preliminary investigation was to determine whether
Ms. Watkins had raised issues sufficient to warrant a full-scale investigation of the nature
that she had suggested. As agreed with Enron, Vinson & Elkins’ “review would not
include questioning the accounting transactions.” Powers Report p. 173. “Instead,
Vinson & Elkins would conduct a ‘preliminary investigation’ which was defined as
determining whether the facts raised by Watkins warranted further independent legal or
accounting review,” p. 173. Vinson & Elkins could reasonably agree to conduct a
preliminary inquiry of this nature and scope.
My review of Ms. Watkins’ letter, the Powers Report, and the Vinson & Elkins report
establishes that, as agreed with its client, Vinson & Elkins’ investigation focused on
whether Ms. Watkins had raised new facts regarding the issues of business and
accounting judgment cited in her letter and supplementary materials, not on the quality of
the legal work previously performed for Enron by Vinson & Elkins. There was no
conflict of interest for Vinson & Elkins to undertake such an investigation because it
would not be sitting in judgment of its own legal services.
Enron’s annual payment of millions in legal fees for many matters to Vinson & Elkins
over an extended period prior to the time of the investigation did not create a conflict of
interest for Vinson & Elkins. It is quite common for companies to call on their primary
outside counsel with whom they do the most work in such circumstances. This
investigation was not a full “independent counsel” investigation in the sense, for
example, of the investigation conducted by the lawyers who assisted in preparing the
Powers Report. Neither Enron nor Vinson & Elkins regarded it as such an “independent
counsel” investigation, and that was reasonable under the circumstances.
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Although Vinson & Elkins has been criticized for accepting the word of the people it
interviewed in the investigation, it bears noting that Vinson & Elkins, like any lawyer,
may properly assume that its client is telling the truth absent evidence to the contrary.
Vinson & Elkins could also rely on the accountants, Board members, employees, and
officers who knew of the transactions and the accounting treatment of the transactions.
In summary, it is my opinion based on the Powers Report and Vinson & Elkins’ Report
that:
•

There was no conflict of interest in Vinson & Elkins’ conducting a preliminary
inquiry into the concerns raised by Sherron Watkins.

•

Enron and Vinson & Elkins could properly limit the preliminary inquiry to
whether the facts justified a full scale “independent” investigation.

•

The fact that Vinson & Elkins had previously earned millions of dollars in fees
from Enron did not disqualify it from ethically conducting a preliminary
investigation of the kind often performed by the main outside counsel for
corporations.

•

Vinson & Elkins could properly accept the word of the officers of its client and
rely on the judgment of the accountants, Board members, employees, and officers
in reaching its conclusions.

•

It would be highly unusual for a law firm in the position of Vinson & Elkins to
decline in these circumstances to undertake such a preliminary investigation on
ethical grounds. It is customary for clients like Enron to turn to large law firms
that are acquainted with the company’s business and transactions to conduct
preliminary investigations and make recommendations, such as Vinson & Elkins
was asked to do here.
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•

I find no breach of any ethical rule by Vinson & Elkins in accepting and
conducting the preliminary review of the concerns raised by Sherron
Watkins.

Very truly yours,

Charles W. Wolfram
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APPENDIX II

[Transcribed]
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.

TRUSTEE PROFESSOR OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
2300 CHESTNUT STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19104
TELEPHONE: 215-898-7494

September 28, 2000

CONSULTING OFFICE ADDRESS
513 CEDAR LANE
SWARTHMORE, PA 19081
TELEPHONE: 610-544-4550
FAX: 610-544-5083

Mary Elizabeth McGarry, Esq.
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett
425 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10017-3954
Re: Nextel Communications, Inc.

Dear Ms. McGarry:
This responds to your request for my opinion concerning the
propriety, under the rules of professional ethics in New York, Virginia and
other jurisdictions, of the arrangement set forth in the September 28, 2000
Draft Confidential agreement, and related proposed documentation
(collectively, “Agreement”), a copy of which you have sent me.
The proposed Agreement includes a detailed Alternative Dispute
Resolution procedure for resolving claims by claimants (“Claimants”) of
employment discrimination in employment or application for employment
with Nextel Communications, Inc. and its affiliates (“Nextel”) who are
represented by the law firm of Leeds Morelli & Brown (“Leeds Morelli”).
Several hundred Claimants are involved. The Agreement calls for processing
the claims of the Claimants on a measured but expedited basis, through a
dispute resolution process involving an interview and negotiation, mediation
if necessary and binding arbitration if necessary. The Agreement
contemplates that Leeds Morelli and Nextel will proceed cooperatively to
process the claims, including mutual exchange of information concerning
the claims, through the three-stage procedure, culminating in an agreed-upon
resolution or a determination though arbitration and a General Release by
any Claimant receiving any award.
Under the Agreement, Nextel will pay to Leeds Morelli agreed
amounts in lieu of the attorneys’ fees and expenses that the Claimants would
otherwise be obligated to pay Leeds Morelli.
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The Agreement further expresses the intention of Leeds Morelli not
to accept representation of other persons with similar claims against Nextel
outside the framework of the Agreement, and obligates Leeds Morelli to
refrain from referring to other lawyers’ prospective claimants who may
inquire with Leeds Morelli.
The parties believe that the dispute resolution process will benefit
both the Claimants and Nextel. The fee to be paid the law firm takes account
of the fact that the firm will have to engage in a large and expensive staffing
arrangement in order to present and process the claims on the expedited
basis.
In addition, the Agreement calls for engagement of Leeds Morelli by
Nextel, after completion of the dispute resolution process for all of the
Claimants represented by Leeds Morelli, to serve as a consultant and provide
assistance and legal advice with regard to equal employment and affirmative
action matters. Nextel, which is presently an adversary of these Claimants,
will thereupon become a client of the firm representing the Claimants. This
engagement can benefit present and future Nextel employees, as well as
Nextel itself, by providing objective and experienced guidance in the
company’s handling of employee relations.
The Agreement has other provisions concerning the arrangements
among Claimants, Leeds Morelli and Nextel, some of which are noted
below.
The Agreement contemplates that the payment by Nextel to Leeds
Morelli of an amount of attorneys fees and expenses will be disclosed to the
Claimants and their consent obtained. Such a disclosure and informed
consent is required. See New York DR 5-107(a), the provisions of which
correspond to counterpart rules in Virginia, Va. Code of Prof.
Responsibility, Rule 1.8(f), and all other jurisdictions. See American Bar
Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.8(f). I assume
that Leeds Morelli has and will continue to exercise independent
professional judgment on behalf of the Claimants, in reaching and
implementing the Agreement. On that basis, and upon disclosure and
informed consent, the payments arrangement is in my opinion compatible
with the foregoing ethical standards.
The contemplated agreement whereby Leeds Morelli will refrain from
undertaking representation of other claimants outside the framework of the
Agreement is, in my opinion, compatible with applicable ethical standards,
having regard for circumstances involved. Generally, a lawyer may not
agree to refrain from representation of other potential clients in connection
with settlement of a controversy on behalf of a client. See New York DR 2-
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108(B). Virginia’s rule is less restrictive. See Va. Code of Prof. Resp. Rule
5.6(b) However, in the present situation the representation of the Claimants
under the Agreement could well constitute a conflict of interest with other
potential clients, in light of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Inc., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), and Amchem Products, Inc.
v. Windosor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). Such a conflict could result in jeopardy to
the settlements under the Agreement, and thus be disadvantageous both to
Nextel and, eventually, to various Claimants. In addition, the Agreement
contemplates continuing cooperative procedures between Leeds Morelli and
Nextel that could be jeopardized if the law firm pursued litigation on terms
inconsistent with the Agreement. In these circumstances, in my opinion the
agreement by Leeds Morelli does not improperly “restrict” the firm’s right to
practice within the intendment of New York DR 2-108(B). For the same
reason it does not constitute a “broad restriction” on Leeds Morelli, see Va.
Code of Prof. Resp., Rule 5.6(b). The Leeds Morelli agreement not to refer
to other lawyers any potential claimants who make inquiry of the firm falls
in the same category.
The contemplated arrangement whereby Nextel will engage Leeds
Morelli after the claims are resolved is set forth in the proposed Agreement
and hence will be made prior to conclusion of the settlement process. The
prospect of such employment would involve a conflict of interest on the part
of the Leeds Morelli firm. See New York DR 5-105(a); Va. Code of Prof.
Resp., Rule 1; ABA Model Rule 1.7. However, in my opinion it is a
“constable” conflict, i.e., a conflict that may be waived by the affected
clients. Obviously, Nextel will not become a client until the settlements are
resolved. However, the individual Claimants are present clients of the Leeds
Morelli firm and their informed consents should be obtained.
The consents should address both of the arrangements, i.e., the
payment in lieu of the Claimants’ attorneys fee and expenses and the
contemplated subsequent employment of Leeds Morelli by Nextel.
It is not obligatory that the consents of the claimants represented by Leeds
Morelli be in writing, except in a few jurisdictions such as California.
However, the Agreement appropriately calls for the consents to be in
writing, partly as protection against misunderstanding and subsequent
dispute but also to impress on the clients that a substantial matter is
involved.
You have inquired whether the payment in lieu of the Claimants’
attorneys’ fees and expenses may be made through one fund rather than in
separate payments. In my opinion the method of payment is a matter of
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convenience, so long as the fact of the payments is disclosed and made the
basis of a consent on the part of the affected Claimants.
In addition, I note the following provisions of the proposed
Agreement:
First, the Agreement provides that the claim and resolution of each
Claimant is not to be disclosed to other Claimants. In my opinion this is
proper. The procedure and substance of the arrangement under the proposed
Agreement is not an “aggregate settlement” within the meaning of New
York DR 5-106(A); Va. Code Prof. Resp., Rule 1.8(g); and ABA Model
Rule 1.8(g). An “aggregate settlement” is one in which a fixed sum is to be
divided among two or more claimants. In such a settlement, fairness to the
participants requires that each one know the allocation made to the others.
The procedure under the proposed Agreement, in contrast, calls for separate
settlement or resolution of each Claimant’s claim on its own footing.
Accordingly, in my opinion the rule concerning disclosure in aggregate
settlements has no application.
Second, the form of Individual Agreement sets forth a consent by the
Claimant executing such a document to the conflicts described above. Such
a consent is valid only if predicated on adequate disclosure. I assume that
Leeds Morelli will provide such a disclosure. The disclosure should be in
writing for any claimant who is a resident of California.
Third, the Agreement calls for the Claimants to continue engagement
of Leeds Morelli through the whole ADR process. The Claimants can make
such a commitment on a moral basis but it is not legally binding. A client
has authority to discharge a lawyer at any time, for any reason or no reason.
There are decisions suggesting that this right of discharge may not be
infringed by imposition of adverse consequences to a client who exercises
the right. I express no opinion whether the provisions on this subject in the
proposed Agreement constitute such an infringement. I recommend that the
disclosure and consent by the Claimants address this issue.
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